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Preface 
The primary concern of economists in the area of corporate 
mergers has been potential anti-competitive effects. Little syste-
matic research has been devoted to local economic impacts of cor-
porate acquisitions. The probable reasons for this research vacuum 
are twofold. First, economists have long recognized that short run 
dislocations are a necessary by-product of a well-functioning market 
economy. Second, the conventional economic wisdom has tacitly 
assumed that acquisitions of local firms by large national corpora-
tions typically result in increased employment and payroll in the 
community of the acquired firm. 
This study indicates clearly that local economic impacts of cor-
porate mergers deserve greater attention. The Nebraska data refute 
the conventional wisdom and reveal that acquisitions have resulted 
in an outflow of employment opportunities and corporate control 
from Nebraska. Similar outflow is common to other sparsely popu-
lated states. In the light of an expressed national desire to halt the 
unprecedented movement of population to metropolitan areas, 
adverse local impacts of corporate acquisitions assume a national 
social and economic significance. 
This monograph is a result of a year of research undertaken to 
complete a doctoral dissertation at the University of Nebraska. I 
am indebted to several individuals for the help which they rendered. 
First and foremost, I would like to publicly thank my wife Terri, 
who key punched computer cards, performed numerous calcula-
tions, and typed the various manuscripts. 
Since most of the data were collected from the Nebraska Labor 
Department, Division of Employment, lowe a large debt to several 
individuals in this Division. I especially wish to thank Les Johnson 
for his cooperation and aid. The study would not have been possible 
without his generous assistance. 
I also wish to thank Professors Campbell R. McConnell and 
John R. Felton of the Department of Economics, University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln, for their valuable suggestions and encourage-
ment. Finally, I am indebted to the University of Nebraska - Lin-
coln Bureau of Business Research for aid during the early stages 
of the project. 
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PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
CORPORATE ~ERGERS 
A considerable amount of time and research effort has been 
devoted to the analysis of the effects of corporate mergers upon 
industrial concentration.1 Likewise, much research has been under-
taken with respect to the relationship between economic concentra-
tion and market performance. Indeed, the primary economic con-
cern associated with mergers and acquisitions is the possible anti-
competitive effects which may accompany them. Thus, the Federal 
Trade Commission staff has pointed out: "The major public policy 
concern arising from mergers is that they have the effect of entrench-
ing or creating market power, thereby rendering competition 
ineffective as a regulatory mechanism."2 
Although the anti-competitive potential associated with mergers 
must remain the primary focus of economic research in the merger 
area, there exists an equally important need to assess secondary 
economic impacts of corporate marriages. In light of the phe-
nomenal increase in mergers during the past decade and the fact 
that the recent merger wave is increasingly of a conglomerate na-
ture, these "secondary" economic effects, in fact, may push their 
way to the forefront of policy concern. In particular, the local eco-
nomic impacts of corporate acquisitions require careful appraisal. 
Also, the directional flow of corporate control and its accompanying 
geographic concentration should be of interest to researchers and 
policy makers. 
THE RESEARCH VACUUM 
Dr. Willard ~ueller, former director of the Bureau of Eco-
nomics, Federal Trade Commission, pointed out to a Senate sub-
committee in November 1969 that: 
Little systematic research has been conducted on the im-
pact of mergers on local communities .... The most compre-
hensive study undertaken to date was conducted by the 
Bureau of Business Research and Service of the University 
of Wisconsin for the Governor of the State of Wisconsin.3 
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It is this research vacuum, along with severe methodological 
weaknesses of the Wisconsin study, * which has led the author to 
undertake the empirical and analytical study which follows. 
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
This analysis will provide at least partial answers to the fol-
lowing questions: 
1. To what extent have Nebraska firms been involved in the 
current merger wave? What has been the nature and scope 
of this Nebraska involvement? How do Nebraska merger 
characteristics, i.e., size of firm, type of merger, industry of 
the acquired firm, compare with those of the United States 
as a whole? 
2. What were the primary and secondary motives associated 
with the Nebraska acquisitions? What institutional factors 
have served to encourage merger activity? 
3. How did the pre-merger employment and payroll growth 
rates of the acquired firms compare to non-acquired firms 
in the same industry? 
4. What were the local employment and payroll impacts of 
the mergers? 
5. ''\That was the geographical pattern of the transfer of con-
trol? To what extent did changes in sources of supply and 
locational changes in the use of financial institutions result 
from the acquisition? 
This research clearly transcends the Wisconsin study both in 
scope and in empirical substance. The Wisconsin study relied 
heavily on questionnaires as a means of assessing the impact of the 
Wisconsin mergers. In attempting to ascertain employment and 
payroll effects, the Wisconsin effort compared pre-merger growth 
rates to post-merger rates. As will be pointed out in Chapter IV, 
this method of comparison failed to isolate the merger effect. The 
present study, using correlated tests for matched-pairs, compared 
pre- and post-merger rates of acquired firms with the pre- and post-
merger rates of hypothetical average firms within their 2-digit indus-
tries. Furthermore, aggregate employment and payroll impacts of 
the corporate mergers were estimated. 
This study also transcends the Wisconsin study in that it traces 
the geographical flow of corporate control which resulted from the 
acquisition of the Nebraska firms. In addition, the acquired Ne-
* These weaknesses will be described in Chapter IV. 
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braska firms were classified and analyzed by type of merger, 4-digit 
industry, and employment size. These classifications allowed a direct 
comparison of the Nebraska merger movement with the recent 
United States merger experience. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the Wisconsin study 
examined an important local impact which this study did not, 
namely, the effect of mergers on contributions to community causes. 
Therefore, this Nebraska study expands and complements the ",\Vis-
consin research. The two studies, taken together, serve as a research 
beginning in the important area of state and local economic im-
pacts of corporate mergers. 
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Specifically, this research attempts to test systematically the gen-
eral validity of the conventional wisdom that firms which are 
acquired by other corporations are typically dying enterprises and 
that the merger brings with it an infusion of new and progressive 
management along with expanded financial resources. The result, 
so this argument goes, is growth of the acquired operation. This 
expansion includes greater employment and payrolls and, therefore, 
additional local spending, tax collections, and so forth. Thus, the 
real winner is the total community. 
If, by chance, the acquired corporation was a financially suc-
cessful one showing vigorous growth, then the merger would, in the 
view of the conventional wisdom, serve to accentuate this growth. 
In a statement introduced into official Senate hearing records by 
Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska, Ira G. Corn, Jr., Senior Execu-
tive Officer of the Michigan General Corporation, stated: 
Assume the example of a privately-held company recently 
acquired as a marginal operation with turnabout potential. 
Ownership of such a corporation by a conglomerate has a 
great beneficial impact. Added capital creates both a greater 
challenge and job security for management and manpower. 
Customers are better served with better products. Suppliers 
enjoy increased business. Efficient facilities are developed, 
lower production costs are achieved, and greater profit mar-
gins are attained. Higher Federal, State, and local taxes are 
paid. 
Assume the example of an acqulSltlOn of a highly suc-
cessful, privately-held firm. It is likely to have its momentum 
accelerated under conglomerate management .... 4 
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Nor is the conventional wisdom confined solely to corporate 
executives. Donald F. Dewey has stated that the majority of mer-
gers " ... are merely a civilized alternative to bankruptcy, or the 
voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from failing to rising 
firms."5 
Henry Manne, in a sense, has theoretically formalized and ra-
tionalized the conventional wisdom.G According to Manne, the 
separation of ownership and control of American enterprise, in 
conjunction with inadequate product market competition, results 
in a general business environment which allows professional man-
agers to operate their concerns inefficiently. The possibility of a 
takeover via acquisition, however, performs a function which assures 
an efficient allocation of resources. This possibility serves as a po-
tential punishment for management which is not maximizing 
profits. 
vVhy is this the case? According to the Manne position, ineffi-
cient management and accompanying sluggish corporate growth 
will serve to lower the price-earnings ratio of the corporation's 
stock. Firms with low stock-earnings ratios are prime targets for 
takeover. * It will thus be slow-growing firms dominated by ineffec-
tive management which will be ripe for acquisition. The truly well-
managed corporation will not likely become the object of an 
acquisition attempt. 
It is clear that Manne's position, though more sophisticated, 
leads to conclusions similar to those expressed by Mr. Corn. Acqui-
sitions, on the average, are likely to involve slow-growing firms. 
Upon acquisition these enterprises, on the average, will have 
increased profits and corporate growth rates. 
TYPES OF .MERGER ARRANGEMENTS 
Before proceeding to an examination of the merger movements 
in Nebraska and the United States, it is necessary to establish a 
definitional framework. Mergers may be of several forms and types. 
Broadly speaking, a merger is said to occur: "VVhenever one 
company acquires, assumes, or otherwise gains control over the 
assets of another company by an exchange of assets or equity seClui-
ties, or when two companies combine to form a brand new enter-
prise."7 
Mergers may be of two basic forms: acquisitions or consolida-
tions. s An acquisition occurs when the acquiring firm retains its 
identity. The acquired concern may also retain its name as a sub-
* The reason this is the case will be examined in Chapter III. 
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sidiary of the larger corporation or it may undergo a complete 
identity change. A consolidation occurs when two or more corpora-
tions are combined into a new identity. The large majority of 
mergers involving Nebraska firms, 1964-1968, were acquisitions 
rather than consolidations. 
Distinguishing between types of mergers is a more difficult task 
than determining their forms. Scholars have employed various 
categorizations of mergers by type. For the sake of providing a 
basis for comparing Nebraska data to United States merger data, 
the author has utilized standard Federal Trade Commission merger 
definitions in classifying Nebraska mergers. * 
Basically mergers are of three distinct types: horizontal, vertical, 
or conglomerate. Horizontal mergers are those which involve firms 
which produce closely related products and sell these products in 
the same geographic market. An example of this type of merger 
is the acquisition of Nixon and Company, a livestock feed producer, 
Omaha, by Nebraska Consolidated Mills, also of Omaha. This hori-
zontal combination was consummated in 1966. 
Vertical mergers are those in which the firms involved have a 
buyer-seller relationship. These mergers, therefore, may be either 
"forward" or "backward" depending upon whether the acquiring 
firm purchases a firm which buys its product or one which supplies 
raw materials or components. An example of a forward vertical 
acquisition would be the 1968 purchase of Pioneer Glass and Paint 
Co., Omaha, a paint wholesaler, by Benjamin Moore Corp. of New 
York, a paint producer. On the other hand, the acquisition of Craft 
Guild Products of Omaha by Josten's Inc., Minnesota, in 1968, is 
an example of a backward vertical merger. Josten's Inc., produces 
trophies while Craft Guild builds trophy bases. 
The third type of merger is the conglomerate combination. 
These mergers may be subdivided into three types. Conglomerate 
mergers of the geographic market extension variety are characterized 
by mergers which involve firms which produce the same product 
* Some observers have concluded that the I<"rc definitions of conglomerate 
mergers are too inclusive. All mergers which do not specifically fit the horizontal 
and vertical categories are classified as some type of a conglomerate. As a result, 
it is argued that the FTC data greatly m"gnify the actual conglomerate nature 
of the current merger movement. See in particular Samuel R. Reid, "Conglom-
erate Growth: Consistency with Economic Theory of Grmnh," in Economics of 
Conglomerate Growth, Leon Garoian, ed. (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State Uni-
versity, 1969) pp. 44, 45. The author, though sympathizing with this contention, 
has nevertheless concluded that the advantages associated with using the FTC 
definitions far outweig'h any misconceptions which might arise from their use, 
Comparisons of the Nebraska and overall merger movements require a common 
set of defini tions, 
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or service but sell them in different geographic markets. An example 
of this type of conglomerate acquisition would be the acquisition of 
Center Bank, Omaha, by Northwest Bank Corporation, Minne-
apolis, in 1965. 
A conglomerate merger may be of a product extension type. Such 
mergers involve firms which are related in production and/or 
distribution but whose products do not directly compete with one 
another. The 1967 merger between Allegheny Ludlum Steel Cor-
poration, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Ogallala Electronics Manu-
facturing, Ogallala, was of the product extension type. Imperial 
Eastman Corporation's 1967 takeover of Brunning Co., Lincoln, 
was also of this basic conglomerate type. 
A final category of conglomerate mergers may be called pure 
conglomerates. Those mergers involve totally unrelated diversifica-
tion. No functional or buyer-seller relationship exists. The acqui-
sitions of the Sun Newspaper of Omaha and the National Indem-
nity Co., Omaha, by Berkshire Hathaway, New Bedford, Massachu-
setts, were of the pure conglomerate type. Likewise, the 1966 pur-
chase of Nebraska Crib and Silo Co., Fremont by Fugua Industries, 
Atlanta, Georgia, was a pure conglomerate acquisition. 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
In the following chapter the magnitude, scope, and nature of 
the recent Nebraska merger movement are compared and contrasted 
with the United States experience. Nebraska mergers are classified 
by type of merger, industry of the acquired firm, and employment 
size. In Chapter III, factors encouraging mergers are explored. 
Questionnaire responses are utilized as a beginning point for an 
analysis of merger motives of both acquired and acquiring firms. 
Chapters IV and V deal with local economic impacts of cor-
porate mergers. In the former, results of statistical tests employing 
pre- and post-merger employment and payroll growth rates are 
reported and analyzed. In addition, aggregate employment and pay-
roll effects are estimated. In Chapter IV, the directional flow of 
corporate control resulting from Nebraska acquisitions is traced. 
Possible adverse local economic effects are examined. In the final 
chapter, policy implications of the research findings are explored. 
II/The Magnitude, Scope, and Nature of the 
Recent Merger Movements Within the 
United States and Nebraska 
THE NATIONAL MERGER EXPERIENCE 
The industrial organization of American enterprise has under-
gone two major merger movements and is currently in the midst of 
a third. Each period of intense merger activity has served to alter 
the basic structure of American enterprise. 
The first major merger movement in the United States began 
about 1895 and lasted midway into the first decade of the new cen-
tury. The basic outcome of this movement was the successful 
achievement of greater market concentration. This wave of merger 
activity was dominated by several large horizontal and vertical 
mergers within the steel, tin, tobacco, copper, and farm machinery 
industries. 
Such industrial giants as United States Steel, duPont, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph, and American Tobacco trace their 
origins to mergers consummated during this 1895-1905 period. 
Ralph L. Nelson, a prominent scholar of American merger 
movements, has concluded that the first merger wave transformed 
industries characterized by many medium and small-sized firms 
" ... into those in which one or a few very large enterprises occu-
pied leading positions. It laid the foundation for the industrial 
structure that has characterized most of American industry in the 
twentieth century."l 
The second major wave of merger activity occurred in the 
1930's. This movement, like its predecessor, was composed primarily 
of horizontal and vertical mergers initiated by investment bankers. 
Much of the industrial concentration achieved in the initial move-
ment had become diluted by the entry of new firms. Thus, the 
second merger movement was characterized by an attempt to re-
claim market power.2 In addition, the second movement witnessed 
several mergers and acquisitions designed to establish concentration 
in new and emerging industries. 
7 
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Though primarily horizontal in nature, some conglomerate 
mergers of the geographic market extension type did occur during 
the second movement. These took place mainly within the dairy and 
food retailing industries. 
During the 1921-1933 period, nearly $13 billion of assets were 
acquired. These $13 billion of assets amounted to a cumulative 
17.49 percent of the total manufacturing and mining assets in the 
United States.3 The second wave of merger activity peaked in 1929. 
This wave was not effectively restrained by Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. In fact, Supreme Court decisions between 1926 and 1934 
served to render Section 7 useless as a governmental anti-merger 
weapon.4 
THE SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE CURRENT MERGER MOVEMENT 
The contemporary merger wave began during World War II. 
It may be divided into two parts, 1943-1947 and 1950 to the present. 
The early portion of the current movement brought forth increases 
in concentration in the textile, alcoholic beverage, paper, and 
cement industries, while the later 20-year experience has produced 
the widespread dominance of the conglomerate industrial structure. 
The current merger experience has been the longest in duration of 
the three major American movements; it has also been the largest 
in terms of the number of firms involved. 
Figure 2-1 compares manufacturing and mining acquisitions 
during each of the three major merger periods. Only large acquisi-
tions (over $10 million in assets) are recorded. 
During the 1950-1968 period, 15,096 mergers took place, and 
over 600 occurred each year since 1965. In fact, 5,941 acquisitions 
took place in the four-year period, 1965-1968. As seen in Figure 2-1, 
2,444 mergers were consummated in 1968 alone. The fact that 39.35 
percent of all mergers occurring during the 18-year period did so 
in the last four years, 1965-1968, clearly shows the recent monu-
mental growth of merger activity in the United States. 
Figure 2-1 understates total merger activity since it includes 
only manufacturing and mining mergers. The number of acquisi-
tions within the trade and service industries has also increased 
sharply in recent years, particularly in 1968. The growth of mergers 
in trade and services is documented in Table 2-1. 
The magnitude of the current merger movement may also be 
measured with respect to the total volume of assets acquired. Table 
2-2 clearly establishes the fact that the value of acquired assets has 
increased drastically during the 1965-1968 period. Once again, 
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only mmmg and manufacturing firms are included. Table 2-2, 
unlike Table 2-1, however, includes estimates of assets of small firms 
(under $10 million asset size).5 
FIGURE 2-1 
THREE MERGER MOVEMENTS COMPARED, MANUFACTURING AND 
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Figure 2-2 depicts Table 2-2 graphically and also shows the 
relationship of acquired assets to the number of firms acquired. 
The growth of mergers within the trade and service industries 
(Table 2-2) is also illustrated. 
If one compares the assets of acquired firms with total new 
investment within manufacturing and mining, the magnitude of 
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Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Total 
TABLE 2-1 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN TRADE AND 
SERVICES, 1960-1968 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade Services 
127 123 
255 220 
235 236 
186 155 
207 247 
191 312 
188 223 
232 310 
452 696 
1,893 2,525 
Total 
250 
475 
471 
344 
454 
503 
411 
542 
1,148 
4,418 
SOURCE: Adapted by author from FTC Staff Merger Report, 1969. Appendix Table 1·14, 
p.679. 
the current wave is seen in yet an additional aspect. In 1960, the 
acquire assets were $2.3 billion; in 1968, $15.2 billion. As a per-
centage of total new investment, acquired assets increased from 15.0 
percent in 1960 to 54.6 percent in 1968. Table 2-3 shows these 
relationships. 
It should be obvious from Table 2-3 that a growing percentage 
of available expansion funds are being used to purchase existing 
assets, while a diminishing percentage is being utilized to purchase 
new capital. It is, of course, only the latter which adds to total eco-
nomic capacity. The 1967-68 period is particularly interesting. New 
capital expenditures failed to increase during these two years while 
the volume of assets acquired increased sharply. 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Total 
TABLE 2-2 
TOTAL ASSETS OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING 
FIRMS ACQUIRED, 1960-1968 
Assets Assets 
(Millions) Year (Millions) 
$2,326 1965 $ 4,914 
2,630 1966 5,416 
2,990 1967 10,81.5 
3,947 1968 15,200 
3,670 
$51,908 
SOURCE: Adapted by author from FTC Merger Report, 1969. Appendix Table [·3, p. 667. 
Before proceeding to an examination of the merger experience 
within Nebraska, several additional facts concerning the scope and 
magnitude of the current merger movement might be mentioned. 
All of the following points were gleaned from the comprehensive 
1969 Federal Trade Commission staff report on corporate mergers: G 
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1. Only six corporations with assets of $250 million or more 
were acquired during the entire 1948-1966 period. Six such 
corporations were acquired in 1967; 12, in 1968. 
2. Nearly all of the acquired corporations with $25 million or 
more assets were profitable in the year prior to the merger. 
3. Sixty-three percent of all firms in the $10-25 million asset 
size class were acquired sometime during the 1948-1968 
period. 
FIGURE 2:-2 
NUMBER AND TOTAL ASSETS OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING FIRMS 
ACQUIRED AND NUMBER OF TRADE AND SERVICE 
ACQUISITIONS, 1960-1968 
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1-3, and 1-14. 
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4. In 1959 there were 883 firms of $25 million· plus asset size. 
If the number of such firms had grown at the same rate 
relative to total manufacturing assets as they did between 
1949 and 1959, 2,209 such firms would have existed in 1969. 
Instead, there were 1,354 firms in this size class in that year. 
Merger activity accounts for most of the difference. 
5. A total of 327 corporations ranked among the largest 1,000 
manufacturing companies of 1950 had been acquired by 1968. 
TABLE 2-3 
ACQUIRED ASSETS COMPARED WITH NEW INVESTMENT IN 
MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1960-1968 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Total 
(Billions of Dollars) 
;\lew 
Investment" 
$ 15.47 
14.66 
15.76 
16.73 
19.77 
23.75 
28.46 
28.11 
27.86 
$190.57 
Total 
Assets Acquired 
$ 2.326 
2.630 
2.990 
3.947 
3.670 
4.914 
5.416 
10.815 
15.200 
---$51.908 
a As reported in Economic Report of the President, 1969, p. 271. 
Acquired Assets 
as Percentage of 
New Investment 
15.0% 
17.9 
19.0 
23.6 
18.6 
20.7 
19.0 
38.5 
54.6 
27.2% 
SOURCE: Adapted by author from FTC Staff Merger RellOrt, 1969, Appendix Table 1·4, 
p. 668. 
THE NATURE OF RECENT INDUSTRIAL COMllINATION: 
THE TYPE OF MERGER 
The nature of the corporate merger movement has changed 
remarkably during the 1948-1968 period. The current merger 
movement has increasingly become a conglomerate phenomenon. 
It is obvious from Figure 2-3 that while horizontal mergers, in terms 
of acquired assets, declined relatively, conglomerate-type acquisi-
tions increased from 37.5 percent of the 1948-1951 total to 88.5 
percent of the assets acquired in 1968. Vertical mergers also de-
clined relatively during the 20-year period. 
Another facet of the changing nature of corporate mergers is 
evident. Pure conglomerate mergers-those in which unrelated di-
versification occurred-increased from zero percent of total conglom-
erate acquired assets at the beginning of the period to 43.6 percent 
of such assets in 1968. Thus two definite patterns have evidenced 
themselves: 
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1. Horizontal and vertical mergers have declined relative to 
conglomerate mergers. 
2. Pure conglomerate mergers have increased relative to other 
types of conglomerate combinations. 
FIGURE 2-3 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS ACQUIRED IN LARGE MERGERS. 
o HOItI&ONT~L 
P~oO~.~ ~~R~'T 
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BY TYPE, 1948-1968 
_ V£IC'TICAL 
putt.C 
SOURCE: Compiled from FTC Staff Merger Report, 1969. 
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THE NATURE OF RECENT INDUSTRIAL COMBINATION: 
THE INDUSTRY OF THE ACQUIRED FIRM 
Unfortunately, national data on mergers by industry of the ac-
quired firm do not exist. Such a disaggregation of Nebraska mergers 
will be presented later. Several facts, however, are clear from the 
national data which are available. 
As noted earlier, merger activity in the trade and service indus-
tries increased more rapidly than in manufacturing and mining, 
1960-1968. Likewise, the holding company has achieved new vi-
tality.7 Given the movement toward unrelated diversification, non-
manufacturing corporations have increasingly been acquired by 
manufacturing entities and vice versa. 
In general, it may be concluded that the current upswing in 
merger activity has affected nearly all industries in the United 
States. The recent movement has not been confined to a relatively 
limited number of industries as in the earlier merger waves. The 
Nebraska data, gathered by the author, confirm this general con-
clusion. 
THE NEBRASKA MERGER EXPERIENCE 
THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM 
Owing to the extreme difficulty of identifying Nebraska firms 
which were involved in merger activity, only a five-year period, 
1964-1968, was utilized as a basis for the analysis which follows. 
No single agency or organization had a complete listing of Nebraska 
mergers, but several bodies had a partial listing of acqmsItIons 
which in some manner fell under their jurisdiction or scope of 
concern. 
Briefly, the Nebraska mergers were identified in the following 
manner: 
1. National Industrial Conference Board monthly A nnounce-
ments of Mergers and Acquisitions were scrutinized over the 
five-year period. This process yielded several large mergers 
involving Nebraska-based firms. The Conference Board list-
ing includes only large acquisitions. 
2. Financial journals such as Standard and Poor's and Moody's 
were used to attempt to trace specific acquisitions. 
3. The Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, pro-
vided a partial list of Nebraska firms acquired by the 200 
largest manufacturing corporations in the United States. 
Much of the FTC data was compiled from confidential 
sources and could not be released. 
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4. Approximately 75 questionnaires were sent to Chamber of 
Commerce officials and bank presidents throughout the state 
seeking their help in identifying mergers involving firms in 
their localities. Responses to the questionnaire yielded a sub-
stantial number of mergers. 
5. A tedious search through data made available by the Re-
search and Statistics Division, Division of Employment and 
Wages, Nebraska State Labor Department, was undertaken. 
The Employment and ''''age Division records all formal 
changes in business ownership in conjunction with its admin-
istration of the Unemployment Compensation program. Of 
course, most of the changes of ownership which occurred 
during the five-year period under review were not mergers. 
This is to say, they simply involved the selling of a business 
to another individual, the inclusion of a new partner, or the 
incorporation of the enterprise. Therefore, the true mergers 
or acquisitions had to be distilled from the numerous changes 
of ownership. Individual files on each firm were helpful in 
this regard. 
Though each of the above methods contributed to the establish-
ment of the Nebraska merger list, the last proved to be the most 
helpful. Some mergers, particularly those involving stock transac-
tions, were not included. However, nearly all mergers involving two 
Nebraska firms were identified through the Unemployment Com-
pensation records. 
Only mergers involving acquired Nebraska-based companies 
were included in the Nebraska list. If, for example, an out-of-state 
based corporation had operations in Nebraska, and this out-of-
state corporation was then acquired, the change of ownership of 
the Nebraska operations was not included in the Nebraska merger 
list. Thus, for example, although North American Van Lines had 
business establishments in Nebraska and was purchased by Pepsi 
Co., Inc., in 1968, the change of control of the Nebraska establish-
ments was not considered to be a Nebraska merger. 
The Nebraska merger list which was compiled also excluded 
mergers in which Nebraska-based corporations purchased out-of-
state businesses. It will be demonstrated later that only a small 
number of Nebraska corporations have been active acquirers of 
out-of-state firms. 
The identification procedure was very time consuming. Never-
theless, the methods utilized allowed for cross checking and, there-
fore, yielded a rather comprehensive sample of Nebraska merger 
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activity, 1964-1968. A total of 149 acqmsltlons were identified. It 
is probable that nearly all acquisitions of large Nebraska firms were 
included and that a large percentage of all acquisitions of firms 
with more than ten employees were represented. A partial listing 
of these mergers is printed in the Appendix. Many of the 149 
acquisitions were obtained through confidential records and, there-
fore, are not included in this listing. 
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE NEBRASKA MERGER EXPERIENCE 
In many respects the Nebraska merger experience during the 
period 1964-1968 broadly mirrored that of the overall national 
movement. 
In Table 2-4 and Figure 2-4, the 149 mergers are divided into 
two groups. One group includes all mergers in which a Nebraska 
firm was acquired by an out-of-state corporation; the other, mergers 
or acquisitions involving Nebraska firms only. Hereafter, the former 
mergers will be referred to as Nebraska-Outstate; the latter, Ne-
braska -Nebraska. 
A steady increase in merger activity is evident throughout the 
five-year period. It is clear, in particular, that there has been a 
sharp upswing in merger activity involving the acquisition of Ne-
braska firms by outstate corporations. On the other hand, the num-
ber of Nebraska-Nebraska mergers has remained quite constant 
during the last four years of the period. 
Over 33 percent of the Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions occurred 
in 1968, and nearly 60 percent took place in either 1967 or 1968. 
Overall, 55.03 percent of the mergers occurred in 1967 and 1968 
while only 22.82 percent were consummated in the first two years 
of the study. This trend, though not directly comparable to the 
national data, * is reflective of the national merger experience as 
shown in Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1. 
THE SIZE OF NEBRASKA ACQUIRED FIRMS 
Asset data on each firm was not recorded. However, it will be 
seen later in this chapter that the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers 
largely involved relatively small firms while the opposite was the 
case with respect to the outs tate mergers. Therefore, in terms of 
acquired assets, the increase in the magnitude of the Nebraska 
merger movement, 1964-1968, more closely approximates the Ne-
braska-Outstate trend line in Figure 2-4 than it does the total trend 
line. 
* The national data include only large acqnisitions, i.e., those with assets 
of $10 million or more. 
Recent Merger Movements / 17 
TABLE 2-4 
MERGERS INVOLVING NEBRASKA FIRMS, 1964-1968 
Year Nebraska-Outstate Nebraska-Nebraska I Total 
1968 28 16 44 
1967 21 17 38 
1966 16 17 33 
1965 9 16 25 
1964 9 0 9 
Total 83 66 149 
Percent of Total 55.70 44.30 100.00 
FIGURE 2-4 
MERGERS INVOLVING NEBRASKA FIRMS, 1964-1968 
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During the 1955-1968 period, Nebraska firms with assets of over 
$129 million were acquired by members of the 200 largest United 
States manufacturing firms alone. Table 2-5 summarizes these acqui-
sitions. 
Table 2-6 indicates the employment size range of Nebraska firms 
which were acquired by corporations located outside of the state. 
Thirty-eight percent of the firms acquired are considered "small" 
firms in that they had fewer than 25 employees at the time of acqui-
sition. Another 38 percent fall into the medium-sized category, and 
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TABLE 2-5 
PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES IN NEBRASKA ACQUIRED BY MEMBERS OF 
THE 1968 200 LARGEST MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 1955-1968a 
Value 
in Year 
Prior to 
Year of Acqui-
Acqui- Name of Name of sition 
sition Acquiring Co. Acquired Co. (Millions) 
1955 Campbell Soup Co. C. A. Swanson and Sons $ 25.1 
1955 Consolidated Foods Ocoma Foods Co. (Omaha 
Cold Storage Co.) 
1956 Fruehauf Corp. Independent Metal 4.3 
Prods. Co. 
1956 Proctor and Nebraska Consolidated Mills 
Gamble Co. Co. of Omaha (Division) 
1957 Martin -Marietta Platte Valley Cement 1.3 
Corp. 
1960 TRW, Inc. Good-All Electric 3.2 
Manufacturing Co. 
1961 National Distillers Farm Fertilizers, Inc. 0.7 
and Chemical 
1961 Standard Oil Co. Imperial Casualty and 6.4 
of Indiana Indemnity Co. 
1964 Mobil Oil Corp. Northern Natural Gas 78.0 
Producing 
1964 Rohm and Haas Co. Grain Belt Supply Co. 0.6 
1965 Avco Corp. Iowa Finance Co. 16.0 
Total $129.2 
a This is only a partial list since some of the acquisitions in this category were taken 
from confidential sources. 
SOURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. 
24 percent are classified as "large" firms by virtue of employing 
over 100 workers. 
It should be pointed out that the average Nebraska firm (sub-
ject to unemployment compensation) had only 20 employees in 
1968. Therefore, most of the firms acquired by outstate corporations 
were larger than the typical Nebraska firm. In fact, 39 of a sample 
of 54 Nebraska-Outstate mergers had more employees at the time 
of acquisition than the average number of employees per firm 
within the SIC 2-digit classification of their respective industry. 
Firms acquired by other Nebraska firms were, on the average, 
smaller in terms of employment than firms purchased by corpora-
tions residing outside of the state. In fact, the Nebraska-Nebraska 
mergers tended to be of two basic types. Either relatively small N e-
braska firms merged or large Nebraska firms acquired medium-sized 
or small ones. Over 83 percent of the firms acquired by other N e-
braska firms were small, i.e., they had fewer than 25 employees. 
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TABLE 2-6 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS, 1964-1968, SIZE CATEGORY OF 
ACQUIRED FIRM AT TIME OF ACQUISITION" 
Employment 
Size Category 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total 
Fewer than 25 4 5 4 8 9 30 
25-100 2 4 9 'I 8 30 
101-200 I 0 3 2 5 II 
201-500 0 0 0 2 3 5 
Over 500 2 0 0 0 I 3 
79 
a FOllr of the 85 firms are excluded owing to a lack of employment data. 
Table 2-7 indicates the size pattern of Nebraska-Nebraska acqui-
sitions. Figure 2-5 compares mergers as to the percentage of total 
acquisitions within each size category. 
THE NATURE OF RECENT NEBRASKA MERGERS: THE TYPE OF MERGER 
As noted earlier, the recent national merger movement has been 
characterized by a remarkable shift toward conglomerate mergers. 
Conglomerate mergers composed 79.8 percent of assets acquired in 
large manufacturing and mining mergers during the 1964-1967 
period, and 88.5 percent of such assets in 1968. 
The predominance of conglomerate mergers may also be seen 
in the Nebraska data, particularly in connection with Nebraska-
Outstate mergers. * Table 2-8 describes the Nebraska experience, 
1964-1968, by type of merger; Figure 2-6 depicts each type of merger 
as a percentage of all mergers. 
As indicated in Figure 2-6, nearly 70 percent of all N ebraska-
Outstate mergers were of the conglomerate type, while only 51.56 
percent of the instate mergers were of this variety. It would appear 
from Table 2-8 that a large majority of the Nebraska-Nebraska 
acquisitions were of the horizontal or quasi-horizontal variety in 
that 40.9 percent were horizontal and another 39.3 percent were 
geographic market extension. The fact that the Nebraska-Nebraska 
mergers generally involved small localized firms, of course, explains 
the predominance of horizontal-type mergers. The Nebraska-Out-
state acquisitions, on the other hand, involved, for the most part, 
larger firms and, therefore, tended to conform more closely to the 
national percentages by merger type. 
* l\'ebraska mergers were classified on the basis of National Industrial Con-
ference Board information, 4·digit SIC codes, and a direct questionnaire sent 
to many of the firms involved. 
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TABLE 2-7 
NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS, 1965-1968, SIZE CATEGORY OF 
ACQUIRED FIRM AT TIME OF ACQUISITIONa 
Employment 
Size Category 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total 
Fewer than 25 12 13 15 I4 54 
25-100 3 3 2 0 8 
101-200 1 0 I 3 
201-500 0 0 0 0 0 
Over 500 0 0 0 0 0 
65 
a One of the 65 Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions is excluded owing to a lack of employ-
ment data. 
TABLE 2-8 
NEBRASKA MERGERS, 1964-1968, BY TYPES OF COMBINATION 
Type of Nebraska- I NebraSka-I Percent 
Merger Outstate Nebraska Total of Total 
Horizontal 18 27 45 30.20% 
Vertical 7 5 12 8.05 
All conglomerate 58 34 92 61.74 
Geographic market 
extension 34 26 60 40.27 
Product extension 15 6 21 14.09 
Pure conglomerate 9 2 II 7.38 
Total 100.00% 
Fifty-three of the 92 conglomerate mergers occurred in 1967 and 
1968, and nearly 84 percent of the Nebraska-Outstate conglomerate 
mergers occurred in these two years. Thus it is clear that the Ne-
braska merger experience, as the broader movement of which it is 
a part, is characterized by an increase in merger activity and a 
relative increase in conglomerate combinations. 
The movement away from horizontal and vertical mergers is at 
least partially explained by the enactment and enforcement of the 
Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. This 
so-termed "Anti-Merger Amendment" has seemingly failed to halt 
the advance of the merger wave; rather it has served to change the 
nature of the advance. 
THE NATURE OF RECENT NEBRASKA MERGERS: THE INDUSTRY OF 
THE ACQUIRED FIRM 
The Nebraska mergers were classified by SIC 4-digit industry 
codes. The 4-digit codes were recorded for both the acquiring and 
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FIGURE 2-5 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE AND NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTALS BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE CATEGORY, 
1964-1968 
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acquired firms. Owing to the vast number of these 4-digit classifica-
tions, the acquired firms were sorted into 2-digit industry classifica-
tions. The 2-digit classifications, in turn, were combined into 
broader industry categories. 
Tables 2-9 and 2-10 reveal the broad industry categorization of 
the acquired Nebraska firms. Several observations may be made on 
the basis of these tables. First, it is clear that the industry patterns 
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FIGURE 2-6 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE AND NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTALS BY TYPE OF MERGER, 1964-1968 
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o 
in both the Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions 
were nearly identical, except for the fact that there were four 
instate acquisitions within the mining and construction industries 
and no outs tate purchases within these areas. Manufacturing acqui-
sitions accounted for 28.79 percent of the instate purchases and 
33.73 percent of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers. 
Second, the Nebraska data parallel the national merger exper-
ience in that there were more acquisitions of firms within the trade 
and service industries than in manufacturing and mining. In fact, 
in 1967 and 1968, there were 50 mergers involving trade and service 
firms and only 22 acquisitions of mining and manufacturing con-
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cerns. This is understandable since Nebraska has far fewer firms 
engaged in manufacturing than in selling goods and services. * 
Within manufacturing, 21 of 47 Nebraska acquisitions, or 44.68 
percent, involved SIC code 20 (Food Products) . Nationally, the food 
product industry has been subject to a high degree of merger 
activity.s 
Thirdly, the Nebraska mergers reflect the broader trend in 
another respect. Thirteen mergers involved firms engaged in finance, 
insurance, or real estate. Several of these mergers were of the broad 
holding-company type. For example, Northwest Bancorporation, a 
bank holding company headquartered in Minneapolis, acquired 
Center Bank of Omaha. Berkshire Hathaway of New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, acquired the National Indemnity Co. and the Na-
tional Fire and Marine Insurance Co., both of Omaha. Fidelity 
Banker's Life of Richmond, Virginia, purchased Central National 
Insurance Group of Omaha in 1968. Thus the recent national trend 
toward large mergers within the finance and insurance industries is 
reflected in the Nebraska experience, 1964-1968. 
TABLE 2-9 
BROAD INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS OF NEBRASKA FIRMS ACQUIRED BY 
OUTSTATE FIRMS, 1964-1968 
11964119651196611967119681 Total 1 
Percent 
Broad Industry of Total 
Manufacturing 4 2 9 4 9 28 33.73% 
Transportation, Communi-
cations and Utilities 3 0 I 0 2 6 7.23 
Trade 2 3 5 12 10 32 38.55 
Wholesale (I) (2) (4) (6) (5) (18) 
Retail (I) (I) (I) (6) (5) (14) 
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 0 3 2 I 7 8.43 
Services 0 I 0 3 6 10 12.05 
9 9 16 21 28 83 100.00% 
Finally, it might be noted that, although Nebraska retail trade 
establishments outnumbered wholesale establishments 5,273 to 1,964 
in 1968, acquisitions of wholesale establishments outnumbered 
those of retail concerns 31 to 25 over the five-year period. t 
.. In 1968, Nebraska had only 1,278 firms engaged in manufacturing while 
it had 9,972 businesses providing goods and services (firms subject to unemploy-
ment compensation). 
t Includes only firms subjected to unemployment compensation. 
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TABLE 2-10 
BROAD INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION OF NEBRASKA FIRMS ACQUIRED BY 
OTHER NEBRASKA FIRMS, 1965-1968 
19661 1 Total I 
Percent 
Broad Industry 1965 1967 1968 of Total 
Mining 0 0 2 3.03% 
Construction 0 1 0 2 3.03 
Manufacturing 2 9 7 19 28.79 
Transportation, Communi-
cations and Utilities 3 0 3 0 6 9.09 
Trade 5 5 4 10 24 36.36 
'Wholesale (4) (3) (2) (4) (13) 
Retail (I) (2) (2) (6) (II) 
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 4 0 I 6 9.09 
Services I I 2 3 7 10.61 
16 17 17 16 66 100.00% 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The current merger movement in the United States is the long-
est in duration of the three major merger waves, and it has sur-
passed its predecessors in magnitude. The 1966-1968 portion of the 
current wave, in particular, has been characterized by a tremendous 
growth in both the number of mergers consummated and the vol-
ume of assets acquired. In addition, the nature of the recent wave 
of merger activity has been distinct from the two which preceded 
it. The recent merger scene has been dominated by conglomerate 
mergers and has witnessed spectacular increases in merger activity 
within the trade, services, finance, and insurance industries. 
The Nebraska merger experience, 1964-1968, has been, in gen-
eral, a reflection of the overall pattern. As many Nebraska firms 
were purchased by outstate corporations during this period as were 
acquired by other Nebraska concerns. Furthermore, the firms pur-
chased by corporations residing outside of Nebraska tended to be 
relatively large firms compared with the firms purchased by instate 
companies and compared with the average-sized firm within their 
respective 2-digit industries. Conglomerate combinations dominated 
the Nebraska merger scene, particularly in those cases where Ne-
braska firms were acquired by out-of-state corporations. 
III/Merger Motives 
MERGER MOTIVES OF ACQUIRED FIRMS 
The evidence presented in the preceding chapter establishes 
that merger activity has been a growing phenomenon during the 
last decade. Furthermore, this activity has increasingly involved 
Nebraska firms. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine pos-
sible explanations for this rapid merger advance and to explore 
possible motives underlying merger agreements. Of course, there 
are two parties to any merger agreement so merger motives of the 
acquired firm, as well as those of the purchaser, need to be scrut-
inized. 
It would appear from a survey of the relevant literature that, 
while a great deal of attention has been devoted to merger motiva-
tions, this attention has been one-sided. That is, most discussions 
of merger motives are analyses of why firms desire to purchase 
other firms or why two relatively equal-sized corporations wish to 
combine. The Nebraska experience, however, is largely one char-
acterized by large firms purchasing smaller local enterprises. In 
Chapter IV it will be shown that these acquired firms do not, on 
the average, appear to be failing enterprises at the time of acquisi-
tion. Therefore, it is of interest to attempt an assessment of the 
reasons why these local firms agree to become a part of a larger 
corporate structure. * 
Assessing another person's motives for undertaking a particular 
action is a precarious business. This is particularly true with respect 
to merger decisions, since these decisions are often made jointly 
by several individuals. One individual's motive for selling control 
of the business may be quite different from the motives of other 
parties to the decision. Furthermore, in asking the decision-makers 
why they decided to engage in a merger, hidden motives are not 
likely to surface. On the other hand, it is not proper to assume that 
all direct responses are less than truthful. Regardless of the potential 
* Some mergers, of course, result from stock takeovers which are beyond the 
control of the acquired firm. The discussion which follows is concerned with 
only those firms which willingly enter into merger agreements. 
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biases, expressed merger motives provide a logical starting point 
for a broad discussion of the complex merger-motivation question. 
EXPRESSED MERGER MOTIVES OF NEBRASKA ACQUIRED FIRMS 
In order to ascertain possible motives associated with agreeing 
to be acquired, the author surveyed 23 executives of Nebraska firms 
which were acquired during the period 1964-1968. Each of these 
executives was associated with the acquired Nebraska firm at the 
time of acquisition. * Fifteen of the Nebraska firms were acquired 
by firms located outside of the state; eight, by other Nebraska-based 
concerns. 
In each case, the executive was given a list of potential merger 
motives and was asked to check those which were applicable to his 
firm's merger. He was then asked to rank the applicable motives 
by numbering them. If motives other than those listed were in-
volved, the respondent was asked to check "Other" and was given 
space to amplify on this as well as on the other choices. 
TABLE 3-1 
MERGER MOTIVES AS EXPRESSED BY EXECUTIVES OF 
ACQUIRED NEBRASKA FIRMS 
Nebraska -Ou tsta te Nebraska-Nebraska 
First I Other First Other 
Motives Choice Mention Choice Mention 
Death of owner 0 0 0 0 
To solve estate tax problems I 0 0 0 
To obtain corporate or personal income 
tax advantages 0 0 0 I 
To acquire greater financial resources I 5 2 I 
To obtain marketing advantages 0 5 I 2 
To obtain research and development 
advantages I 2 0 0 
Pl'Oduct diversification I I 0 I 
To enhance growth potential 3 I 2 4 
Aging management I 3 I I 
To obtain stock market listing 0 2 0 0 
Attractiveness of acquirer's offer 5 2 1 I 
To obtain production economies 0 0 0 3 
Other 2 0 1 0 
-
Total 15 21 8 14 
* A total of 75, five-page questionnaires were mailed to acquired Nebraska 
firms. Fifty-one of the firms responded to the questionnaire. Of these 51 responses, 
23 were former executives of the acquired company who thus could meaningfully 
answer the question dealing with merger motives of the acquired company. 
Owing to the obvious limitations of the survey technique and the nature of the 
sample, the author does not, of course, seek to make statistical inferences from 
the data. Rather the data provide an interesting starting point for a general 
discussion on motives. 
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Tables 3-1 and 3-2 describe the results of the survey. The re-
sponses are divided into Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate 
categories. 
TABLE 3-2 
MERGER MOTIVES AS EXPRESSED BY EXECUTIVES OF ACQUIRED 
NEBRASKA FIRMS, COMBINED TABULATION 
Nebraska·Outstate 
and Nebraska-Nebraska 
First Other Total 
Motives Choice Mention Mention 
Death of owner 0 0 0 
To solve estate tax problems I 0 I 
To obtain corporate or personal 
income tax advantages 0 
To acquire grea ter financial 
resources 3 6 9 
To obtain marketing advantages 1 7 8 
To obtain research and 
development advantages 1 2 3 
Product diversification 1 2 3 
To enhance growth potential 5 5 10 
Aging management 2 4 6 
To obtain stock market listing 0 2 2 
Attracti1'lCness of acquirer's offer 6 3 9 
To obtain production economies 0 3 3 
Other 3 0 3 
Total 23 35 58 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY 
The most cited reasons for agreeing to be acquired were the 
following, in descending order: 
1. The enhancement of growth potential. 
2. The acquisition of greater financial resources. 
3. The attractiveness of the acquirer's offer. 
4. The realization of marketing advantages. 
Closer inspection of Table 3-2, however, indicates that the 
responses associated with items 1 and 4 above were mainly second-, 
third-, and fourth-ranked responses. In terms of first-ranked motives, 
"the attractiveness of the acquirer's offer," and "the enhancement 
of growth potential" were clearly dominant, constituting 47.82 per-
cent of all first-choice responses. 
While a diversity of merger motives was cited, there existed a 
conspicuous lack of responses indicating efficiency-type motives. 
Three such categories, "production economies," "research and de-
velopment economies," and "marketing economies," were cited as 
first-choice motives for merging in only two of the 23 questionnaires. 
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Of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers involved in the survey, 68.75 
percent were conglomerate. This fact apparently explains why only 
6.67 percent of the executives in this group selected one of the 
"efficiency" motives as a first choice. Conglomerate mergers, by their 
very nature, enable few, if any, true economies. It is interesting to 
note, however, that only one of the eight Nebraska-Nebraska re-
spondents indicated one of the "efficiency" motives as a primary 
reason for his merger. Inasmuch as 75 percent of these firms were 
engaged in horizontal or vertical mergers, a higher proportion of 
"efficiency" responses might have been expected. 
The "product diversification" category received only a single 
first-choice mention from the executives of firms acquired by out-
of-state corporations. This might seem strange in light of the fact 
that a large percentage of these mergers were conglomerate combi-
nations. However, it must be remembered that the reasons cited 
are those associated with the acquired firm and not those of the 
acquiring corporation. 
What might be concluded from the Nebraska survey? First, it 
must be remembered that the questionnaire approach is of limited 
usefulness. Therefore, it is extremely risky to make inferences, sta-
tistical or otherwise, from the data. However, assuming a tolerable 
amount of bias, one might conclude that, insofar as the acquired 
firms are concerned: 
1. Nebraska merger motives are, in general, quite diverse. 
2. Merger motives cited by involved executives tend to indicate 
that financial considerations, e.g., the attractiveness of the 
acquirer's offer, are more important than motives centering 
around obtaining efficiencies or economies. 
3. Many of the executives surveyed were of the opinion that 
the merger would enhance the growth of the local firm. 
THE OVERALL MERGER CLIMATE 
Inasmuch as "the attractiveness of the acquirer's offer" was one 
of the most-cited merger motives given by executives of acquired 
Nebraska firms, one must examine the overall merger climate which 
has enabled larger corporations to advance attractive offers to 
smaller localized firms. In other words, one must examine the other 
side of the merger coin. 
It would appear that the thrust of the recent merger phenom-
enon has come from a desire to acquire, as opposed to a desire to 
be purchased. If the limited Nebraska data are representative, it 
would seem that the attractiveness of the buyer'S offer looms as a 
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large motivation in many decisions to merge. In order to be able 
to make an attractive offer, the acquirer must feel that the merger 
will result in substantial financial benefits. The questions which 
need to be answered, therefore, are "What financial benefits are 
likely to be realized from a corporate merger?" and "How are these 
benefits related to the current merger phenomenon?" 
MERGERS AND THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Merger activity is positively correlated with overall business 
activity. According to Willard F. Mueller, former director of the 
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission: 
The conclusion suggested by our analysis is this: Although 
there may be a variety of unique reasons underlying particu. 
lar mergers, the overall rate of merger activity is associated 
with general economic conditions, and there appears to be a 
particularly close relationship between merger activity and 
stock prices.! 
Business expectations are largely a function of current and ex-
pected product demand and profits. In an economic expansion, of 
course, current demand and profit levels are relatively high. In 
light of these high levels of profits and demand and in the absence 
of reasons to expect that the economic expansion will soon recede, 
corporations have an incentive to expand their operations. This 
expansion may take place via either internal or external corporate 
growth. * In many instances, institutional factors serve to encourage 
external growth at the expense of internal expansion. These factors 
will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. 
In view of the chain of causation explained above, the highly 
positive statistical correlation between business activity and mergers 
is quite logical. In essence, "prosperity accelerates mergers because 
it accelerates business expansion."2 
To the extent that stock prices are a proxy of business expecta-
tions, it is not surprising to discover also the existence of a close 
relationship between these prices and merger activity. Furthermore, 
it has been pointed out that during a general upswing in stock 
prices disparities are likely to develop in the price-earnings ratio of 
various issues. As will be shown later in the chapter, such dispari-
ties encourage merger activity since instantaneous gains in earn-
ings per share may be realized. 
* Internal growth refers to new investment in plant and equipment and the 
expansion of existing operations. External growth refers to expansion via acqui-
sition or merger. 
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The merger experience of the 1960's is thus a reflection of 1) an 
expanding economy, 2) increasing stock prices, and 3) institutional 
factors which, in many instances, encourage growth through acqui-
sition. The tremendous upswing in merger activity in 1967 and 
1968, both nationally and in Nebraska, was paralleled by vigorous 
economic expansion and a rising stock market. 
As stated in the preceding paragraph and alluded to earlier, 
certain institutional biases seem to encourage mergers as a method 
of corporate expansion. These institutional perpetrators fall into 
two basic categories: tax factors and accounting factors. Each factor, 
in turn, often enlists the stock market as an ally. 
TAX FACTORS ENCOURAGING MERGERS 
According to the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Com-
mission, "The tax laws in the United States create institutional bias 
in favor of merger activity. Rather than exerting a neutral influence, 
current tax laws actually subsidize mergers."3 
Current tax laws subsidize mergers in a variety of ways. Perhaps 
the largest and most direct subsidy has resulted under Section 368 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Under this statute, capital gains 
resulting from particular types of mergers are exempted from taxa-
tion. These "tax-free mergers" include acquisitions consummated 
through exchanges of voting stock. Thus, a corporation may pay a 
significant premium over the market value for the acquired enter-
prise, yet the acquired firm need pay no tax on the ensuing capital 
gain.4 Thus it is little wonder that "the attractiveness of the acquir-
er's offer" was a leading response in the Nebraska survey. Indeed, 
a large portion of the attractiveness may be due directly to the tax-
free nature of the transaction. 
According to Federal Trade Commission data, approximately 
85 percent of all the large mergers which transpired between 1963 
and 1968 received tax-free treatment. Though the author did not 
determine how each Nebraska merger was accomplished, he did 
acquire such information for three of the largest Nebraska acquisi-
tions. In each of the cases listed in Table 3-3, the merger was con-
summated via an exchange of stock. Since many of the Nebraska 
firms were acquired by large out-of-state corporations, it is safe to 
assume that a substantial number of these acquisitions were of the 
tax-free variety. However, since the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers 
involved on the average small, localized concerns, it is doubtful 
that many of these mergers involved exchanges of stock. 
Another tax bias which has served to encourage mergers involves 
the use of debt-equity switching. If debt securities are exchanged 
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TABLE 3-3 
THREE NEBRASKA MERGERS INVOLVING EXCHANGES OF STOCK 
Year Acquirer 
1964 Mobil Oil 
Corp. 
1964 Rayette Inc. 
1968 Dravo Corp. 
Acquiree 
Northern Natural 
Gas Producing 
Tip Top Products 
Co. 
Hastings 
Industries 
Method of Acquisition 
The outstanding stock 
of Northern acquired 
for exchange of 
946,500 shares of 
Mobil 
Tip Top acquired for 
483,475 shares of 
Rayette on basis of 
2 shares of Rayette 
for each 9 shares of 
Tip Top 
All shares of Hastings 
acquired for exchange 
of 77,000 shares of 
Dravo 
SOURCE: Moody's Industrial Journal and Standard and Poors. 
for the common stock of an acquired firm, tax savings are realized. 
This is the case since interest payments are deductible business ex-
penses for tax purposes. The American Enterprise Institute has 
pointed out: 
... if the company taken over was conservatively capitalized 
and distributed its earnings in the form of dividends, it paid 
taxes ... at the rate of approximately 50 percent. If it is 
taken over by means of debt securities, the shareholders are 
paid interest instead of dividends and the net income from 
the company taken over is increased by the tax benefit from 
paying interest, a deductible business expense, which 
amounts to about 50 percent of the interest.G 
Also, when debt-equity switching is utilized, the capital gains 
tax for the seller may be deferred until the due date on the debt 
securities. This fact, together with the use of interest as a tax deduc-
tion, enables the acquiring firm to make "an attractive offer" to 
the corporation it wishes to take over. 
Corporate mergers may also create superior estate-tax situations 
for individuals who hold controlling interest in acquired firms in 
the form of rather closely-held, non-marketable stock.6 Although 
only a single Nebraska respondent indicated estate-tax advantages 
as a merger motive, this advantage is obviously a compelling motive 
in many small mergers. A Wisconsin survey of 20 executives of 
acquired firms reported that 25 percent of the respondents men-
tioned estate-tax advantages as a merger consideration.7 
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Yet an additional set of tax biases which has served to encourage 
mergers in the United States involves tax losses and tax credits. 
Losses, of course, may be carried forward and utilized as tax deduc-
tions against income. In industries characterized by high degrees 
of obsolesence of plant and equipment and, therefore, by large 
losses, individual firms have an incentive to find a merger partner 
which has sufficient income to utilize the losses as tax deductions. 
Under current corporate tax schedules, "every dollar of profits, net 
after taxes, earned by an acquired corporation is worth $2 in the 
shelter of an acquiring tax loss corporation."8 
In the same vein, investment tax credits have served to induce 
merger activity. In the computer, airline, and equipment leasing 
industries, in particular, where there have been large investment 
expenditures, mergers have been encouraged. This has been the 
case since a corporation desires to have sufficient income against 
which it can apply all of its investment tax credits.9 
It is obvious from the above discussion that the tax structure 
in the United States has been a definite factor underlying the "urge 
to merge." As will be noted in the following section, however, addi-
tional institutional biases exist which tend to encourage corporate 
mergers. 
ACCOUNTING FACTORS ENCOURAGING MERGERS 
The fact that "generally accepted accounting procedures" include 
a wide range of alternative practices has allowed the use of report-
ing techniques designed to maximize the apparent gains from 
mergers. Since the specific method of accounting may change from 
one period to another, financial statements may be made to give 
an appearance of large gains in profits, assets, and sales, when these 
gains may be due solely to acquisitions. Thus mergers, in effect, 
are encouraged since they enable a corporation to have an appear-
ance of a vigorously growing concern. 
The fact that conglomerate firms usually publish financial re-
ports on a consolidated basis masks the profitability of the indi-
vidual components and camouflages internal difficulties. As a result, 
the true effectiveness of the conglomerate management may be 
judged improperly.l0 
One of the most abused accounting techniques has been pool-
ing of interests. When a merger is consummated through the ex-
change of stock, the book value of the assets of the acquired firm is 
simply added to the book value of the acquiring company. The true 
market value of the acquired firm, however, is usually substantially 
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greater than its book value. As a result, the acquiring firm is able 
to list the value of the acquired assets at less than the real cost. 
These supppressed values produce revenues, however, and since 
they are the basis of rate of return computation, the earnings of 
the firm are exaggerated.ll 
Even greater earnings distortions occur when conglomerates sell 
a previously acquired firm. Since the costs of acquiring the firm 
were suppressed, the sale generates "instant earnings." These "earn-
ings" occur whenever the book value of the assets of the firm is 
less than the sale price.12 
An alternative accounting procedure also may be used to distort 
true economic values. The purchase accounting method records the 
costs of acquired assets in amounts equal to their book values and 
records the excess paid over this amount to a static account entitled 
"goodwill." The end result may be much the same as under the 
pooling method. Costs may be suppressed and rates of return 
inflated.13 
Mergers may contribute to illusory earnings growth in yet 
another manner. Instantaneous gains may be realized whenever the 
price-earnings ratio of the acquired firm is less than that of the 
acquiring company.14 
A simple example may illustrate the validity of this statement. 
Assume company A, a conglomerate, is the acquiring firm while B 
is the acquiree. Assume also that each firm has an annual income of 
$1,000 and each has two shares of stock outstanding. Both firms, 
therefore, have earnings per share of $500. Assume that A is a 
"growth conglomerate" and has a price earnings ratio of 20, while 
B has one of 10. Each share of A's stock would be selling for $10,000 
(20 x $500). On the other hand, the market value of each ofB's 
shares would be $5,000 (10 x $500). The combined value of B's two 
shares would be $10,000. 
Company A is able to acquire company B for a single share of 
A. The conglomerate prints a third share, valued at $10,000, and 
gives it to B whose shareholders are delighted to exchange their 
$10,000 worth of stock in B for the $10,000 worth of stock in A. 
Now one may begin to see the emergence of the instant earn-
ings. A has three shares of stock outstanding and earnings of $2,000. 
Earnings per share, therefore, are no longer $500 but $667. The 
new price for each share is $13,340 (20 x $667). Thus, as a result of 
the merger, earnings per share and price per share have increased.15 
Since the stock market appears to reward increases in earnings 
per share regardless of how these increases are achieved,16 external 
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agerial efficiency. In view of several studies which indicate that 
external growth oriented firms are not typically more profitable 
than internal growth firms, it would appear that the "synergy" 
contention also has very little, if any, solid empirical support.23 
Diversification may provide certain financial advantages to cor-
porations, but it is certainly doubtful that any true economies are 
achieved. For example, it has been shown that no significant rela-
tionship exists between the degree of diversification and the amount 
of expenditures on research and development.24 Nor is there a 
systematic relationship between diversification and inventive out-
pUt.25 With respect to the synergy or efficiency contention, the 
author must concur with the FTC Staff Report conclusion that: 
"The balance of evidence so far available lends little support to 
the view that the current merger movement reflects, in substantial 
measure, efforts to exploit opportunities to improve efficiencies in 
resource allocation. 26 
THE SIZE MAXIMIZATION MOTIVE 
A very interesting hypothesis concerning merger motivation 
has been advanced and tested by Samuel R. Reid. It is Reid's con-
tention that "firms which frequently utilize conglomerate mergers 
in their growth strategy tend to be size-maximizers rather than 
profit-maximizers and are engaging in a distinct form of 'conspic-
uous investment.' "27 
Professor Reid supports his hypothesis through an extensive 
empirical study in which he isolates successfully various effects 
of growth strategies. Using analysis of variance, he found that firms 
engaged in conglomerate mergers dominated all of the size-related 
variables while internal growth firms performed better in "profit-to-
stockholders" variables.28 
Reid also made separate tests utilizing distinct subsets of the 
conglomerate group. Three subgroups were established. One sub-
group was labeled "offensive" conglomerates. This group was com-
posed of conglomerates which were extremely aggressive in their 
approach to external expansion. These firms were dominated by 
finance-oriented management and displayed nearly unbelievable 
short-run growth rates. A second subgroup was composed of firms 
which did not appear to be following a planned diversification strat-
egy but occasionally undertook a conglomerate acquisition. This 
subgroup was entitled the "unique" conglomerates. A final sub-
group, "defensive" conglomerates, included firms which diversified 
into other industries owing to the declining nature of the demand 
for their basic product. 
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The analysis of variance technique revealed that each of the 
size-related variables "strongly favored the 'offensive' conglomerate 
and each was statistically significant."29 When the conglomerate 
subgroups were compared to the internal growth subset with respect 
to the usual profit maximization variables, the latter group evi-
denced a clear superiority. 
If personal managerial rewards are more closely tied to firm 
size than to profitability, and ownership and control are separate, 
a plausible rationale for the recent merger wave is established. Pro-
fessional managers, according to this hypothesis, being personal 
gain maximizers, pursue corporate acquisitions even when such 
business transactions are unprofitable in the usual economic sense. 
At first glance, the "Reid hypothesis" would appear to contra-
dict the tax, accounting, and stock market motives. For if external 
growth oriented corporations are not profit maximizers, one might 
argue that they would not be induced by motives which are based 
upon greater profitability. However, on closer inspection, it becomes 
clear that a reconciliation of these seemingly contradictory hypoth-
eses may be achieved. 
The reconciliation requires a modification of the pure revenue 
or size maximization hypothesis. The Baumol constrained-revenue 
maximization modeI,30 for example, is consistent with the combined 
motives. In this model it is assumed that the firm will maximize 
revenue subject to a minimum or "satisficing" rate of return on 
investment. Given the tax, accounting, and stock market advantages 
associated with merger, the firm is able to engage in an otherwise 
unprofitable merger, yet realize the financial gains arising from 
these factors. These gains serve to offset the basic unprofitable 
nature of the acquisition and, as a result, allow profits to remain at 
an overall "satisficing" rate. In addition, of course, the firm expands 
its total size and revenue, and the professional management is re-
warded accordingly. 
The Baumol model enables one to maintain the tax, accounting, 
and stock market factors as important merger motives. These factors, 
in effect, allow the size maximizing firm to make an attractive offer, 
yet maintain a satisficing profit level while pursuing a policy of 
external expansion. 
THE RELATIVE GROWTH OF THE CONGLOMERATE MERGER 
The foregoing discussion of various merger motives sheds con-
siderable light on the underlying reasons for the tremendous merger 
surge of the last two decades. However, the discussion, at first glance, 
seemingly fails to direct itself to the question, "Why has the third 
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merger movement increasingly become conglomerate in nature?" 
The answer to this question lies embedded within the general dis-
cussion of merger motives. 
The nature of the institutional factors encouraging merger, as 
well as the nature of the legal restraints on merger activity, have 
served to channel the recent merger movement toward unrelated 
diversification. The Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, as was alluded in Chapter Ill, does not appear suc-
cessfully to have suppressed the current merger wave. However, this 
so-termed "anti-merger amendment" has been at least partially 
responsible for changing the nature of the merger movement. Spe-
cifically, the evidence indicates that horizontal and vertical mergers 
have come under at least moderate attack by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Justice Department. * This attack, so the argu-
ment goes, has led many corporate executives to believe that hori-
zontal and vertical mergers invite federal investigation. As a result, 
corporations much prefer the conglomerate merger as a means to 
expand their corporate control.3 ! 
Although granting that the "anti-merger amendment" has been 
of considerable influence in directing the merger wave toward 
conglomerates, this explanation, taken alone, is insufficient. Rather, 
the institutional factors which have encouraged mergers (in general) 
have encouraged conglomerate type mergers to an even greater 
extent. The tax advantages discussed earlier in the chapter, for 
example, are often of such a nature that a firm by necessity is forced 
to go outside its own industry to find a partner. This is particularly 
true if tax loss carryovers or investment tax credits are involved. 
Also, given the advantages associated with debt-equity switching, a 
conservatively capitalized firm, regardless of its industry, is a po-
tential target. When a "good buy" of this nature arises, one takes it. 
If the firm happens to be in another industry, so be it. 
The accounting factors, in particular, have encouraged conglom-
erate mergers. The fact that firms of diverse product line are 
brought together allows greater flexibility in achieving "accounting 
earnings" since it becomes nearly impossible for investors to de-
termine what each part is contributing to the whole. Likewise, the 
desire for instantaneous gains in earnings per share, via mergers 
involving firms with low price earnings ratios, compels firms to 
look throughout American industry for merger partners rather 
than to limit the horizon to one's own particular industry. 
* Since the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act, over 800 mergers have been 
challenged, practically all of which were horizontal, vertical, or market-extension. 
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The desire to place oneself in a position which will allow cross-
subsidization may also be an important factor in the conglomerate 
merger phenomenon. Also, the size-maximization hypothesis lends 
itself readily as an explanation for the growth of conglomerates. 
Firms wishing to maximize size, revenues, and corporate power 
must look beyond their own industry if they are successfully to 
avoid antitrust action. Furthermore, if these firms are indeed em-
pire-builders, the conglomerate structure provides a remarkable 
base of economic power and prestige. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It would appear that the conglomerate nature of the current 
merger wave is due largely to a new set of merger motives. These 
motives are not as directly anticompetitive as were the motives 
underlying the first two merger movements. Nor do they revolve 
around a desire to achieve economies. Since this is the case, and 
since the inducements seem to be so compelling, the acquiring firm 
is largely indifferent to the industry classification of the potential 
partner. It would appear that the urge to merge transcends product 
lines as it does broad industry classifications. 
Rather than being forced toward a conglomerate nature by the 
Celler-Kefauver Amendment, the current merger wave has been 
largely drawn toward that nature by the conglomerate's unique 
ability to maximize revenues and managerial income, maximize 
investors' capital gains, and satisfice actual economic profits. 
The desire to find a merger partner is a complex one. It would 
appear that a diversity of merger motives exists and that each 
merger may be undertaken for a variety of reasons. However, it 
appears that institutional biases promote mergers by rewarding 
external expansion. These rewards, in turn, allow the purchaser to 
make extremely attractive offers to the potential acquiree. In many 
instances, the desire to acquire is based upon a constrained revenue 
maximization motive. The empirical evidence seems to suggest over-
whelmingly that few true economies of scale are associated with 
most large mergers. 
IV / Local Employment and Payroll Effects 
of Corporate Acquisition.r 
As stated in Chapter I, the conventional wisdom with respect 
to local impacts of merger activity contends that acquired firms are 
typically slowly growing, poorly managed concerns. Upon acquisi-
tion, new management, together with new and larger sources of 
capital, serve to re-invigorate the local operation. As a result, accord-
ing to this widespread belief, profits, employment, and payrolls will 
likely expand following the acquisition. This expansion will pro-
duce multiplicative economic benefits within the community of 
the acquired firm. 
The proponents of the conventional wisdom, of course, do not 
suggest that local acquisitions will be beneficial in all instances. 
Nor would they contend that no negative effects exist. Rather, ad-
herents of this view believe that, in general, net local benefits will 
be highly positive. 
THE WISCONSIN MERGER STUDY 
The Wisconsin merger study indirectly tested the conventional 
wisdom by examining pre- and post-merger employment and pay-
roll data.! This study found that "the average pre-merger Wisconsin 
employment growth rate of out-of-state acquired firms was 6.02 
percent. Following the mergers, their employment growth rate de-
clined to -.48 percent.'·2 Payrolls also were adversely affected by 
the acquisitions. The pre-merger aggregate payroll growth rate 
among firms acquired by out-of-state corporations was 10.47 percent; 
the post-merger rate, 3.68 percent. 
The Wisconsin findings cast considerable doubt upon the gen-
eral validity of the conventional wisdom. These results are less than 
conclusive, however. Methodological weaknesses in the Wisconsin 
research serve to leave unanswered the question of local employ-
ment and payroll impacts of corporate acquisitions. 
The most serious weakness in the Wisconsin methodology is 
that conclusions were based exclusively upon comparisons of pre-
and post-merger growth rates. Cyclical fluctuations were ignored 
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on the contention that the period under study, 1960-1968, was 
basically one of general economic expansion. Indeed, cyclical fluc-
tuations were relatively slight during this period. However, cyclical 
and/or secular trends within individual industries may run counter 
to overall cyclical and secular trends. 
Thus, data indicating that the acquired firms did not grow, 
on the average, as rapidly as they had grown before the merger 
do not isolate the merger as the causative factor. Perhaps a signifi-
cant number of the acquired firms were in industries which wit-
nessed declining employment and payroll growth rates during the 
period. If this were the case, the acquired firms would show a de-
crease in their aggregate average post-merger growth rate. Yet these 
firms may have experienced employment and payroll growth at 
rates equal to or greater than the majority of the firms in their 
respective industries. "Before" and "after" comparisons simply 
fail to exclude numerous potential causative factors and thereby 
do not isolate the true merger effects. 
Other weaknesses in the Wisconsin study are apparent. One has 
no way of knowing, for example, if observed differences in growth 
rates are statistically significant or are sampling variations within 
the larger Wisconsin merger movement. Also, the ''''isconsin re-
search lacks adequate economic analysis of its findings. One is left 
with no rationale to explain the indicated results. 
NEBRASKA STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The Wisconsin research results, however, regardless of their 
limitations, definitely offer a clear alternative hypothesis to the 
conventional wisdom. The Wisconsin study has raised an important 
issue, and the Nebraska findings shed additional light upon it. 
Obviously, that which is true for acquired firms located in Ne-
braska need not be true for firms in other states. However, as will 
be shown in Chapter V, the recent Nebraska merger experience 
appears to be typical of the acquisition patterns involving firms in 
other sparsely populated neighboring states. The Nebraska merger 
sample is believed to be highly representative of the larger popula-
tion of acquired firms within the Midwestern region. As a conse-
quence, inferences transcending the actual Nebraska experience 
are drawn. 
As described in Chapter II, 149 Nebraska mergers were identi-
fied as having occurred during the 1964-1968 period. A sample of 
90 acquired firms was drawn for purposes of testing the employment 
and payroll impacts of the mergers. Fifty-one of the 90 acquisitions 
consisted of Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state corporations 
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and the remaining 39 involved the acquisition of one Nebraska 
firm by another. 
Employment and 4th quarter payroll data were collected on each 
of the acquired firms in the sample. These data were obtained 
through the Research and Statistics Department of the Division of 
Employment, State Labor Department. All Nebraska firms covered 
under unemployment compensation laws are required to file em-
ployment and payroll reports to this agency on a regular basis. 
December employment and 4th quarter payroll data were utilized 
since these data had the advantage of usually being post-merger 
data in the year of the merger. 
The use of December and 4th quarter data did not bias the 
study. Average annual rates of change in employment and payroll, 
not changes of employment or payroll within a single year, were 
employed in the statistical tests. Since December and 4th quarter 
data were used consistently in computing these rates of change, 
seasonality is of no consequence. The annual rates of change, so 
computed, will logically approximate those employing data from 
any other single month. 
Employment and payroll data were collected for five years prior 
to each merger and for five years following it. In the case of 1967 
mergers, data for only four post-merger years were available; for 
1968 acquisitions, three post-merger years. * 
Once these data were collected, both pre- and post-merger aver-
age annual rates of change were computed. The average annual 
rate of change is equivalent to r in the following equation: 
I + r = (Y jX)1/n where, 
X = original value, Y = new value, and n = the number of years 
between values. The sum 1 + r, of course, is simply the geometric 
mean of the annual relative changes. t 
Since the author desired to eliminate the methodological weak-
nesses of the Wisconsin study, each acquired Nebraska firm was 
matched against a hypothetical average firm in its industry. For each 
of the appropriate years, SIC 2-digit aggregate December employ-
ment and 4th quarter payroll data were collected. These data were 
divided by the number of firms within each industry at each time 
period. This, of course, yielded an average December employment 
* Since the data are from December, the year of the merger is a post· merger 
year. 
t This equation is an alternative presentation of the familiar discounting 
formula. The need for computing a geometric mean, in fact, arises from the 
need to take compounding into consideration. 
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figure and an average 4th quarter payroll figure for each 2-digit 
industry in each appropriate year. It was then possible to compute 
the growth rates for average firms and match them against the 
growth rates of the acquired firms. * 
An example will perhaps clarify the matching process. Company 
A was acquired in April of 1966. Its 4-digit SIC classification was 
5824. The pre-merger employment growth rate, 1961-1965, was 
computed as was the rate of growth of the hypothetical average firm 
in SIC industry 58. The same five-year period was utilized in com-
puting each growth rate. In a similar manner, pre-merger and 
post-merger payroll growth rates were computed for both the ac-
quired firm and its hypothetical industry counterpart. 
The correlated match technique allowed one to test statistically 
the hypotheses under question. If the conventional wisdom was 
valid, the mean pre-merger growth rates of the acquired firms should 
have been significantly smaller than those of the match group. On 
the other hand, the mean post-merger employment and payroll rates 
of the acquired firms should have been equal to, or greater than, 
the mean rates of the hypothetical firms. 
If merged firms were typical of other Nebraska firms with respect 
to growth rates, either pre- or post-merger, then one would have 
expected to find no significant difference between the mean growth 
rate of such firms and the mean growth rate of the hypothetical 
average firms. That is, the mean of the differences between the 
rates of the two groups would have been approximately zero. Since 
the hypothetical firms displayed the average characteristics of their 
industries, approximately one-half of the acquired firms should 
have had growth rates greater than these hypothetical firms; the 
other half, smaller rates. 
The above tendency allowed the author to employ statistical 
techniques which test the differences between group means. Speci-
fically, two-tailed, correlated matched-pair t tests were utilized. In 
each test the null hypothesis was zero difference between means, 
f-tx = f-ty. The alternative hypotheses were f-tx < f-ty and f-tx > f-ty. The 
* SIC 2-digit industry data were utilized in computing the growth rates of 
the hypothetical average firms because they were available. Since the 2-digit 
industries were quite broad, the hypothetical average firms had heterogeneous 
natures. However, the employment of 4-digit aggregate data would have neces-
sitated prohibitively time-consuming and costly computations. Furthermore, 
many 4-digit Nebraska industries were composed of only a few firms. As a result, 
the growth rates of the hypothetical average firms in these 4-digit industries 
might have been influenced unduly by entry and exit of firms. The 2-digit 
industries had the advantage of being sufficiently broad to include numerous 
Nebraska firms. 
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decision to retain or reject the null hypothesis was made at the 
.1 0 level of significance. 
The 90 firms in the sample were divided into two basic groups, 
Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions. These main 
groups were divided into subgroups based upon firm size, broad 
industry classification, and type of merger. In all, 136 matched-pair 
t tests were performed. These tests required the computation of 
approximately 1,000 separate average annual growth rates. 
DATA PROBLEMS 
A troublesome methodological problem was encountered with 
respect to the Nebraska-Nebraska merger data. When a Nebraska 
firm acquired another Nebraska firm, subsequent employment and 
payroll reporting was of two types. Some of the merged firms con-
tinued to report employment and payroll for both of the individual 
units. When this was the case, no problem occurred. However, many 
of the merged firms "pooled interests" and thus reported a single, 
combined employment and payroll. When this occurred, post-
merger growth rates included the growth of both the acquired and 
acquiring units. This fact made it impossible to determine the 
portion of the post-merger growth rate which was attributable to 
the acquired component. 
Matched-pair t tests were performed for the pre-merger growth 
rates of both the acquiring and acquired units in the Nebraska-
Nebraska cases. However, since the majority of post-merger rates 
involved the combined growth of the components of the merged 
firms, the post-merger Nebraska-Nebraska analysis is somewhat 
limited. 
Fortunately, as will be shown in the following chapter, the 
Nebraska-Outstate mergers, as opposed to the Nebraska-Nebraska 
ones, are of primary economic concern. The Nebraska-Nebraska 
acquisitions generally involved small acquirees, and business con-
trol remained within the state. 
The Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions did not present the data 
problems associated with the instate mergers. Nearly all of the out-
state acquisitions involved acquiring firms which did not have 
Nebraska operations prior to their acquisition. In most of those 
cases in which pre-merger Nebraska operations did exist, the firms 
continued to file separate reports for the acquired firms. 
PRE-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS 
The matched-pair t tests on the Nebraska-Outstate employment 
and payroll data do not support the contention that acquired firms 
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are typically slow-growing concerns. Table 4-1 reports the results of 
the Nebraska-Outstate pre-merger employment tests; Table 4-2, the 
results of the payroll tests. In each of the tables, and those which 
follow, n = number of pairs, X = sample mean of average annual 
change for the test group, Y = sample mean of average annual 
change for the match group, t = test statistic, [lD = the population 
difference between ~lx and fly. All italicized t values indicate signifi-
cant differences at, or below, the .10 level. 
As shown in Table 4-1, the mean annual pre-merger employ-
ment growth rate of 51 Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state firms 
was 1.257 percent. The mean growth rate of the hypothetical aver-
age firms was 1.656 percent. This slight difference was not statisti-
cally significant. The null hypothesis, zero difference between means, 
was therefore retained with 90 percent confidence in the correctness 
of the decision. 
Of course, the retention of the null hypothesis, in itself, does not 
allow one to reject the alternative hypotheses. The width and posi-
tion of the confidence interval, however, allows one to conclude 
that the two groups are not sufficiently different to accept the con-
ventional wisdom. The interval tends to suggest that the mean 
difference of the populations is near the hypothesized location 
(zero). 
Table 4-1 also indicates the results of several subgroup tests. 
In each instance, the null hypothesis was retained. It might be noted 
that acquired firms which were involved in product extension merg-
ers were characterized by a very rapid pre-merger employment 
growth rate while firms involved in horizontal, vertical, and geo-
graphic market extension combinations had slightly negative an-
nual growth rates. In each instance, however, the differences 
between the test groups and their matched pairs were not found 
to be statistically significant. 
The results of the payroll tests as shown in Table 4-2 yield 
similar conclusions to those inferred from the pre-merger employ-
ment tests. The average annual pre-merger payroll growth rate 
of the 51 acquired firms was 6.958 percent while the pre-merger 
rate of the matched group was 4.929 percent. Though this difference 
was not significant and the null hypothesis was retained (along with 
the alternative hypotheses), the location of the confidence interval 
once again serves to discredit the contention that acquired firms 
are usually slow-growing or dying enterprises. 
In conclusion, it would appear that firms acquired by non-
Nebraska corporations are typical Nebraska firms insofar as pre-
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TABLE 4-1 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE PRE-MERGER EMPLOYMENT 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group X Y Dccision 
1.257 1.656 -0.619 Rctain j.tx = j.ty 
All Firms 
(n=51) Conf(-1.483 ~ j.tn ~ + .687) = 90% 
Type 
Horizontal and Vertical -0.797 0.408 -0.471 Retain j.tX = j.ty 
(n= 11) 
Geographic Market Extension -0.990 0.962 -0.903 Retain j.tx = j.ty 
(n'= 19) 
Product Extension 6.515 3.823 0.954 Retain j.tX = j.ty 
(n= 14) 
Pure Conglomcrate 0.065 1.167 
Broad Industry 
Manufacturing 1.610 2.223 -0.481 Retain j.tx = j.ty 
(n=22) 
Trade 3.051 0.328 1.000 Retain j.tx = j.ty 
(n= 14) 
Services 
-0.936 2.049 -1.039 Retain j.tX = j.ty 
(n = 15) 
Employment 
Size of 
Acquired Firm 
Over 100 1.256 3.147 -0.844 Retain j.tx = j.ty 
(n= 19) 
Under 100 1.257 0.771 0.320 Retain j.tX = j.ty 
(n=32) 
a No test performed because of the small sample size. 
merger growth of employment and payroll is concerned. This is 
of course a "general" conclusion. Obviously some acquired firms 
are slowly growing or negatively growing concerns; others are v~ry 
rapidly expanding companies. The former, however, certainly do 
not appear to outweigh the latter. 
PRE-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS 
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 report the results of the Nebraska-Nebraska 
pre-merger employment and payroll tests, respectively. These tables 
reveal that the average acquiring Nebraska firm was growing faster 
than the typical Nebraska acquiree. This was particularly true for 
pre-merger payroll growth. Although the acquiring firms in the 
sample were growing at average annual employment and payroll 
rates of 2.920 and 6.641 percent respectively, and their matched 
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TABLE 4-2 
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE PRE-MERGER PAYROLL 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group x y Decision 
6.958 4.929 0.877 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
All Firms 
(n = 51) Conf(-1.932 ~!-Ln ~ + 5.990) = 90% 
Type 
Horizontal and Vertical 
(n= 11) 
Geographic Market Extension 
(n= 19) 
Product Extension 
(n = 14) 
Pure Conglomerate 
(n = 7) 
Broad Industry 
Manufacturing 
(n= 22) 
Trade 
(n = 14) 
Services 
(n= 15) 
Employment 
Size of 
Acquired Firm 
Over 100 
(n= 19) 
Under lOO 
(n=32) 
3.946 4.448 
7.819 3.648 
9.859 7.244 
3.553 4.705 
6.505 5.653 
5.959 4.202 
8.554 4.553 
lO.077 6.062 
5.106 4.257 
R No test performed owing to the small sample size. 
--0.183 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
0.760 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
0.791 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
0.499 Retain !-Lx = !-Ly 
0.567 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
1.5lO Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
0.748 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
0.440 Retain !-Lx = !-LY 
pairs were expanding at mean rates of 0.420 and 3.805, these differ-
ences were not found to be statistically significant. This was also 
the case in the tests involving the acquired firms. 
The test of all acquired firms does not allow one to conclude 
that such firms have slower growth rates than do typical non-
acquired firms. In one of the subgroup tests, however, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. Those Nebraska firms engaged in "Trade" 
displayed a statistically lower mean annual pre-merger payroll 
growth rate than did their control group. The test group had a 
mean of -4.322 while the match group possessed a mean of 4.147. 
It may be concluded with 90 percent confidence that Nebraska 
firms engaged in trade which were acquired by other Nebraska firms 
typically had relatively small or negative rates of payroll growth 
prior to their acquisitions. 
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TABLE 4-3 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA PRE-MERGER EMPLOYMENT 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group 
All Acquiring Firms 
(n=30) 
All Acquired Finns 
(n=39) 
Type (Acquired f'irm) 
Horizontal and Vertical 
(n=20) 
Conglomerate 
(n= 19) 
Broad Industry 
Manufacturinga 
(n = 14) 
Trade 
(n = 17) 
Servicesb 
(n=8) 
a Includes mining. 
x y Decision 
2.920 0.420 1.409 Retain Itx = Ity 
Conf(-.517 ~ ltD ~ +5.515) = 90% 
-0.181 -0.009 -0.099 Retain Itx = Ity 
Conf(-3.705 ~ ltD ~ + 3.361) = 90% 
0.532 -0.213 0.378 Retain Itx = Ity 
-0.405 0.206 -0.205 Retain Itx = Ity 
2.917 -0.683 1.522 Retain Itx = Ity 
-4.482 0.492 -1.746 Retain Itx = Ity 
4.787 0.840 
h No test performed because of the small sample size. 
TABLE 4-4 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA PRE-MERGER PAYROLL 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group 
All Acquiring Firms 
(n= 30) 
All Acquired Firms 
(n= 39) 
Type (Acquired Firm) 
Horizontal and Vertical 
(n = 20) 
Conglomerate 
(n= 19) 
Broad Industry 
Manufacturing' 
(n = 14) 
Trade 
(n= 17) 
Servicesb 
(n = 8) 
a Includes mining. 
x y Decision 
6.641 3.805 1.596 Retain Itx = Ity 
Conf(-.190 ~ ltD ~ +5.862):=: 90% 
1.682 3.538 -0.955 Retain Itx = Ity 
(Conf(-5.141 ~ ltD ~ + 1.429) = 90% 
1.003 3.500 -1.065 Retain Itx = Ity 
1.916 3.580 -0.522 Retain Itx = Ity 
3.717 2.684 0.655 Retain Itx = Ity 
--4.322 4.147 -3.162(-°') Accept Itx < Ity 
11.003 3.739 
b No test performed because of the small sample size. 
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It should be noted that the pre-merger employment growth rate 
for acquired firms engaged in trade was also strongly negative. 
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis was accepted in the employment 
case. 
Returning to Tables 4-1 and 4-2, one may see that the significant 
mean difference in the Nebraska-Nebraska "Trade" group is pe-
culiar to the Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions. The "Trade" firms 
which were acquired by non-Nebraska corporations did not have 
mean growth rates significantly smaller than their matched pairs. 
No test was performed on the Nebraska-Nebraska "Services" 
subgroup owing to the small sample size, but the firms in the 
sample possessed extremely rapid mean pre-merger employment and 
payroll rates relative to their hypothetical average industry coun-
terparts. 
Interestingly, the pre-merger mean rates of firms acquired by 
non-Nebraska corporations exceeded those acquired by other Ne-
braska concerns in nearly every case. At the same time, the industry 
rates were generally slower in the Nebraska-Nebraska cases. A logi-
cal interpretation of the latter difference is that Nebraska firms 
acquired by other Nebraska firms were typically in slower growing 
industries than were those firms acquired by non-Nebraska cor-
porations. 
The conventional wisdom may be descriptive of small localized 
mergers as evidenced by the "Trade" category in the Nebraska-
N ebraska tables. Though the null hypothesis was retained in all 
but one of the pre-merger Nebraska-Nebraska tests, the alternative 
hypothesis (the conventional wisdom) need not be rejected. The 
Nebraska-Nebraska pre-merger experience is much less conclusive 
than the Nebraska-Outstate experience. 
POST-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS 
If corporate acquisitions of Nebraska firms by non-Nebraska 
corporations served to accelerate the growth of the Nebraska firms, 
one would expect to discover that their average post-merger employ-
ment and payroll growth rates would exceed both their pre-merger 
rates and those of average firms within their industries. This is 
definitely not the case. In fact, the opposite is true. The Nebraska-
Outstate firms in the sample had substantially faster pre-merger 
rates than post-merger, and of even greater consequence, their post-
merger rates were significantly smaller than those of the industry 
control group. 
Table 4-5 compares the pre- and post-merger employment and 
payroll rates of firms acquired by non-Nebraska corporations. In 
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both the employment and payroll cases, post-merger rates were 
substantially lower than pre-merger ones. The 51 firms in the 
sample were growing at an average annual pre-merger employment 
rate of 1.257 percent. The mean post-merger rate declined to 
-8.353 percent. The average annual pre-merger payroll rates for 
the acquired firms was nearly 7 percent; the post-merger rate, 
-1.592 percent. Similar results were discovered in each of the test 
subgroups. For example, the firms acquired in product extension 
mergers were growing at a pre-merger rate of 6.515 percent while 
their post-merger growth averaged -10.154 percent. 
The results reported in Table 4-5, of course, do not conclu-
sively demonstrate the true merger effects. In the case of the 1966-
1968 mergers, 1970 employment and payroll data were utilized as 
TABLE 4-5 
COMPARISONS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE PRE- AND POST-MERGERS 
EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL GROWTH RATES 
Test Group 
Type 
All Firms 
(n=51) 
Horizontal and Vertical 
(n = 11) 
Geographic Market Extension 
(n= 19) 
Product Extension 
(n = 14) 
Pure Conglomerate 
(n= 7) 
Broad Industry 
Manufacturing 
(n =22) 
Trade 
(n= 14) 
Services 
(n= 15) 
Employment 
Size of 
Acquired Firm 
Over 100 
(n= 19) 
Under 100 
(n=32) 
Employment 
Growth Rate 
Pre-
Merger 
1.257 
-0.797 
-0.990 
6.515 
0.065 
1.610 
3.051 
-0.936 
1.256 
1.257 
Post-
Merger 
-8.353 
-9.338 
-6.646 
-10.154 
-7.834 
-11.085 
-9.982 
-2.826 
-8.932 
-8.633 
Payroll 
Growth Rate 
Pre-
Merger 
6.958 
3.946 
7.819 
9.859 
3553 
6.505 
5.959 
8.554 
10.007 
5.106 
Post-
Merger 
-1.592 
--4.862 
1.548 
-3.267 
-1.622 
-5.249 
-3.292 
5.360 
-1.552 
-1.615 
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the final post-merger figures in calculating post-merger growth rates. 
Therefore, these rates reflect the impact of the 1970 recession. 
The matched-pair tests eliminated this problem, however. Since 
the post-merger growth rates of the hypothetical average firms also 
were based upon 1970 data for the 1966-1968 mergers, the post-
merger comparisons between these hypothetical firms and the ac-
quired firms eliminated the cyclical problem. The post-merger 
matched-pair technique sufficiently isolated the true merger effects. * 
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 report the results of the post-merger employment 
and payroll tests. 
As may be seen in Table 4-6, corporate mergers involving non-
Nebraska acquirers appear to have had adverse impacts upon the 
employment growth of the acquired firms. It should be recalled 
that the mean pre-merger employment growth rates of the test and 
control groups were found to be near the hypothesized location 
(f!D = 0). In other words, acquired Nebraska firms had pre-merger 
employment growth rates very similar to typical Nebraska firms. 
This was not the case post-merger. With 90 percent confidence, one 
may conclude that post-merger employment growth rates of acquired 
firms typically are significantly smaller than average Nebraska firms. 
During the post-merger years, the hypothetical average firms 
were growing at an average employment rate of 1.618 percent. This 
compares favorably with their pre-merger rate of 1.656 percent. The 
average annual post-merger rate of the acquired firms, however, 
was -8.353 percent. As may be noted in Table 4-6, the adverse em-
ployment effects occurred regardless of the type of merger or the 
firm size. Only in the subgroup "Services" was no significant differ-
ence noted. It would appear that the Nebraska-Outstate merg-
ers have definitely had an adverse employment impact within 
Nebraska.t 
"The merger effects are not totally isolated since the post· merger growth 
rates of the hypothetical average firms included the rates of the acquired firms. 
If mergers had an adverse impact upon the acquired firms, for example, then 
the post-merger industry average rate would be reduced. As a result, the ob· 
served differences between the growth rates of the acquired firms and the industry 
average firms would slightly understate the true differences between acquired 
firms and non-acquired firms. Since in all cases the employment and payroll of 
the acquired firms were only small portions of the total industry employment 
and payroll, this bias is minimal. 
t A matched-pair 4-digit test performed by the author on 21 Nebraska firms 
acquired by conglomerates also supports this general conclusion. The acquired 
firms were paired against similar-sized, non-acquired Nebraska firms on a 4-digit 
industry basis. The differences in pre-merger growth rates were not statistically 
significant. However, the average post-merger employment of the acquired group 
was significantly lower than that of the non-acquired firms. 
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TABLE 4-6 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE POST-MERGER EMPLOYMENT 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group x y Decision 
-8.353 1.618 -3.107(·01) Accept Itx < Ity 
All Firms 
(n=5l) (Conf(-14.878::O=:: ltD ::0=:: -5.064) = 90% 
Type 
Horizontal and Vertical 
(n= 11) 
Geographic Market Extension 
(n = 19) 
Product Extension 
(n=14) 
Pure Conglomerate> 
(n= 7) 
Industry of the 
Acquired Firm 
Manufacturing 
(n = 22) 
Trade 
(n = 14) 
Services 
(n=15) 
Employment 
Size of 
Acquired Finn 
Over 100 
(n= 19) 
Under 100 
(n= 32) 
-9.338 
-6.646 
-10.154 
-7.834 
-11.085 
-9.982 
-2.826 
-8.932 
-8.633 
a No test performed owing to small sample size. 
1.708 -2.105(-'0) Accept Itx < Ity 
1.600 -1.556 Retain Itx = Ity 
1.164 -1.926(·10) Accept Itx < itT 
1.139 
0.324 -3.072(·01) Accept Itx < Ity 
2.516 -3.422(·01) Accept Itx < Ity 
3.080 -0.935 Retain Itx = Ity 
0.942 -2.278(·0') Accept Itx < Ity 
1.223 -2.498(·02) Accept Itx < Ity 
The results of the Nebraska-Outstate post-merger payroll tests, 
Table 4-7, closely parallel those of the employment tests. The ac-
quired companies exhibited an average annual post-merger payroll 
growth rate of -1.592 percent while the control group had an 
average of 6.282 percent. This difference was significant at the .01 
level. 
Manufacturing firms were particularly adversely affected by the 
mergers. The hypothetical average firms engaged in manufacturing 
had an average annual payroll growth rate of 5.609 percent during 
the post-merger years. The acquired manufacturing firms, however, 
had a negative post-merger rate of -5.248. 
Firms with more than 100 employees were growing at an average 
pre-merger payroll rate of 10.077 percent. This growth declined to 
a post-merger rate of -1.552 percent. This rate was significantly 
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lower than the mean rate displayed by the hypothetical average 
firms during the same post-merger years. Likewise, a significant 
difference was observed in the "Under 100 employees" category. 
These firms had an average annual post-merger growth rate of 
-1.615 percent while the control firms had a rate of 7.093 percent. 
It would appear that firm size is not an important factor in deter-
mining the extent of the reduction in the payroll growth rate. 
The conventional wisdom is clearly refuted in the Nebraska-
Outstate merger evidence. Rather than being slowly-growing firms, 
the Nebraska-Outstate evidence indicated that, on the average, 
acquired firms were normal. Upon acquisition, however, these firms 
experienced adverse employment and payroll effects. 
TABLE 4-7 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE POST-MERGER PAYROLL 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Type 
Test Group 
All Firms 
(n =51) 
Horizontal and Vertical 
(n = 11) 
Geographic Market Extension 
(n = 19) 
Product Extension 
(n= 14) 
Pure Conglomerate 
(n=7) 
Industry of the 
Acquired Firm 
Manufacturing 
(n = 22) 
Trade 
(n= 14) 
Services 
(n = 15) 
Employment 
Size of 
Acquired Finn 
Over 100 
(n = 19) 
Under 100 
(n= 32) 
x 
-1.592 
-4.862 
1.548 
-3.267 
-1.622 
-5.249 
-3.292 
5.360 
-1.552 
-1.615 
y Decision 
6.282 -2.909(·01) Accept I-lx < I-ly 
Conf(-12.422 ~ I-lD ~ -3.322) = 90% 
6.800 -2.012(,10) Accept I-lx < I-ly 
6.238 -1.090 Retain I-lx = I-ly 
6.130 -1.685 Retain I-lx = I-ly 
5.889 
5.609 -2.283(·05) Accept I-lx < I-ly 
4.918 -2.403("°5) Accept I-lx < I-ly 
8.540 -0.616 Retain I-lx = I-ly 
5.922 -2.203(-05) Accept I-lx < I-ly 
7.093 -2.265(·05) Accept I-lx < I-ly 
a No tests performed owing to small sample size. 
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POST-MERGER GROWTH RATES: NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS 
The post-merger employment and payroll tests involving Ne-
braska-Nebraska acquisitions indicated that those mergers had no 
significantly adverse impacts upon employment and payroll in 
Nebraska. The average annual post-merger employment and payroll 
growth rates of the combined firms were found not to be signifi-
cantly different from the average rates of the hypothetical industry 
average firms. In each of the post-merger tests, the null hypothesis 
was retained. 
Since it was impossible to determine the proportion of the post-
merger growth attributable to the acquired units, no conclusions 
could be drawn as to the impact of the mergers on the employment 
and payroll of the acquired units. The overall post-merger rates 
may represent any combination of growth of the acquired and ac-
quiring units. 
In terms of Nebraska employment and payroll, however, it does 
not appear that the mergers had either a significantly adverse or 
favorable effect. The pre- and post-merger rates are compared III 
Table 4-8 and the results of the matched-pair tests are shown III 
Tables 4-9 and 4-10. 
At least two possible explanations of the marked difference 
between the Nebraska-Nebraska and Nebraska-Outstate conclu-
sions may be advanced. The first is that the acquisition of one 
Nebraska firm by another precludes the possibility that employment 
and payrolls may be transferred to locations outside of the state. 
The second explanation is explored later. 
TABLE 4-8 
COMPARISONS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA PRE- AND POST-MERGER 
EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL GROWTH RATES 
Test Group 
Acquiring :Firms 
(n = 30) 
Acquired Firms 
(n=39) 
Combined Firms 
(n = 35) 
Employment 
Growth Rate 
Pre- Post-
Merger Merger 
2.920 
-0.181 
0.797 
Payroll 
Growth Rate 
Pre-
Merger 
6.641 
1.682 
Post-
Merger 
6.641 
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TABLE 4-9 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA POST-MERGER EMPLOYMENT 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group X Y Decision 
0.797 2.379 -1.164 Retain r.tx - r.ty 
All Acquired Firms 
(n= 35) Conf(-3.892 ~ r.tD ~ + 0.728) = 90% 
Type (Acquired Firm) 
Horizontal and Vertical 0.027 2.144 -0.976 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(n = 20) 
Conglomerate 1.824 2.693 -0.366 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(n = 15) 
Broad Industry 
Manufacturing' 1.992 2.569 -0.146 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(n = II) 
Trade 2.076 2.969 -0.459 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(n = 16) 
Servicesb -3.403 0.939 
(n=8) 
a Includes mining. 
b No test performed owing to the small sample size. 
TABLE 4-10 
RESULTS OF NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA POST-MERGER PAYROLL 
T TESTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS 
Test Group X Y Decision 
6.641 7.330 -0.361 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
All AcquiTed Firms 
(n= 35) Conf(-3.936 ~ r.tD ~ + 2.558) = 90% 
Type (Acquired Firm) 
Horizontal and Vertical 5.507 7.262 -0.760 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(11=20) 
Conglomerate 8.152 7.419 0.233 Retain r.tx = r.ty (11= 15) 
Broad Ind'ustTy 
Manufacturing' 7.059 8.009 -0.221 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(n = II) 
Trade 7.882 7.Il2 0.326 Retain r.tx = r.ty 
(n = 16) 
Servicesb 3.583 6.784 
(n= 8) 
a Includes mining. 
b No test performed owing to the small sample size. 
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AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL EFFECTS OF THE NEBRASKA· 
OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS 
The matched-pair tests on the Nebraska-Outstate data indicated 
that mergers of this type adversely affected the employment and 
payroll growth rates of the acquired firms. The magnitude of the 
resulting negative impacts, however, could not be determined from 
the growth rates alone. The aggregate employment and payroll 
losses depended upon the sizes of the firms at the time of their 
acq uisi tions. 
In order to estimate these losses, each firm's employment and 
payroll at the time of acquisition was projected to 1970 figures by 
assuming the firm's employment and payroll would have grown at 
rates equal to the average firm in its industry. * The projected 1970 
values were then compared with the actual 1970 ones. The differ-
ence between the aggregated projected values and the actual 1970 
values constituted the aggregate 1970 impact of the 51 mergers, 
1964-1968. 
This methodology was utilized since the pre-merger employ-
ment and payroll growth rates of the acquired firms were not signifi-
cantly different from those of the hypothetical average firms in their 
2-digit industries. t Hence, in the absence of the mergers, one would 
expect that approximately one-half of the firms would have grown 
faster than their industry averages; another one-half, slower. If the 
51 mergers had not occurred, therefore, the actual aggregate 1970 
employment and payroll of the 51 firms would have been approxi-
mately equal to the aggregate values based upon the industry aver-
age rates. Table 4-11 summarizes the estimated 1970 aggregate im-
pacts of the 51 mergers which occurred during the 1964-1968 period. 
The 51 acquisitions of Nebraska firms by out-of-state corpora-
tions resulted in an estimated net 1970 employment loss of 1,762 
and a net 4th quarter payroll loss of $2,959,234. The total 1970 
payroll loss, therefore, would be approximately four times this 
value, $11,836,936. 
,. If the firm was acquired in 1967, for example, then the "appropriate" 
industry growth rate was computed using 1966 through 1970 industry average 
data. The following formula was used to calculate the projected 1970 figures: 
Y = X(l + r)n where,· 
Y = projected 1970 value, X = value at time of acquisition, r = average annual 
growth rate of hypothetical industry average firm, and n = number of years 
between values X and Y. 
t In fact, the average pre·merger payroll growth rate of the acquired firms 
exceeded that of the hypothetical match firms, 6.958 percent to 4.929 percent. 
The estimated aggregate impact, therefore, is a conservative one. 
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Several points regarding this loss need to be underscored. First, 
the estimated loss is for the year 1970 only. The total loss from 
the mergers, including all post-merger years, would be substantially 
greater. Second, only 51 of the 83 Nebraska-Outstate mergers are 
included in this estimate. Also, the 83 mergers occurred in the five-
year period 1964-1968. If all Nebraska-Outstate mergers occurring 
during the entire decade were used in the estimation, the resulting 
1970 figure would be greatly magnified. Third, the 1970 loss is 
"re-occurring" since it will also evidence itself in 1971, 1972, and 
so forth. In fact, the annual magnitude of the negative impact will 
increase because of the acquired firm's negative employment and 
payroll trends. 
A final point deserves careful consideration. The $11,836,936 
loss to the 1970 Nebraska economy was a "primary" loss. "Sec-
ondary" or multiplicative losses also resulted. A dollar reduction in 
household spending in Nebraska creates secondary income losses of 
approximately an additional dollar. * Hence, the total payroll im-
pact of the 51 mergers was approximately $23,673,872. Other poten-
tial "secondary" economic impacts of the mergers are examined 
in the following chapter. 
TABLE 4-11 
AGGREGATE 1970 IMPACTS OF 51 NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS, 
1964-1968 
Employment 
Payroll 
Projected 
8,359 
$16,269,447 
Actual 
6,597 
$13,310,213 
Net Aggregate 
Impact 
-1,762 
-$2,959,234 
(4th Quarter) 
Taking all of these factors into consideration, it must be con-
cluded that acquisitions of Nebraska firms by non-Nebraska corpora-
tions have substantially reduced employment and income within 
Nebraska. This conclusion is true in the aggregate. It is not true 
in each individual merger case. Some Nebraska firms have had large 
annual post-merger growth rates relative to both their pre-merger 
rates and to their industry average rates. 
* The actual Nebraska household multiplier as indicated by Nebraska input-
output tables is 2.12557. See Theodore W. Roesler, F. Charles Lamphear, and 
M. David Beveridge, The Economic Impact of Irrigated Agriculture on the 
Economy of Nebraska (Lincoln: Bureau of Business Research, University of 
;'\!ebraska, 1968), Appendix. 
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EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL EFFECTS 
Several possible explanations for the observed employment and 
payroll effects associated with the N ebraska-Outstate acquisitions 
require examination. One such explanation involves an application 
of the merger-efficiency contention. 
Greater economic efficiency may have resulted in a reduction of 
employment and consequently payroll in either of two ways. First, 
the acquired firms may have employed inefficiently large work forces 
prior to their acquisitions. That is, many employees may have had 
overlapping functions. Upon acquisition, the local operations may 
have become more efficient by eliminating specific jobs and reor-
ganizing and combining others. The net result would be slow 
or negative annual post-merger employment and payroll growth 
rates. 
A second "efficiency" explanation may be offered. Prior to the 
acquisitions, the acquired firms may have had low capital-labor 
ratios. Once acquired, however, the access to new capital sources 
may have allowed the firms to obtain more efficient capital-labor 
mixes. Post-merger growth may have taken the form of capital 
expansion, rather than employment and payroll growth. * 
Both of the "efficiency" explanations, however, appear to be 
tenuous at best. Little evidence exists to suggest that, on the average, 
acquired firms are inefficient firms and that most mergers are accom-
panied by economies. In fact, as noted in Chapter III, the bulk of 
the existing evidence appears to indicate that acquired firms are 
usually profitable enterprises and that few genuine economies result 
from corporate acquisitions. While some overlapping functions 
between the acquired and acquiring units may have existed, it is 
extremely doubtful that the resulting employment and payroll 
effects would be of the magnitudes indicated by the Nebraska post-
merger rates. 
Furthermore, the addition of new capital may just as likely 
expand employment and payroll as reduce it. New investments in 
plant and equipment usually entail "output effects" as well as "sub-
stitution effects." These "output effects" would serve to increase 
employment and thereby mitigate any reductions resulting from 
the substitution of capital for labor. Owing to the reasons cited 
above, the "efficiency" interpretations are deemed to be unsatis-
factory explanations of the adverse Nebraska merger impact. 
* Asset size data on the firms were not available. These data, of coursc, would 
allow onc to test the capital-labor hypothesis. 
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A second potential explanation of the Nebraska results is that 
the acquisitioCls, in general, may have proved to be unprofitable. 
The acquirin~' firms, often conglomerates, may have misjudged the 
potential prolitability of their acquisitions. Upon finding them-
selves in financial difficulties, the conglomerate firms may have 
ordered cutbacks in operations at their smaller units in order to 
free funds to continue operating large units at full capacity. Ne-
braska employment and payroll may have suffered as a result of 
the inability of the conglomerates to sustain overall economic 
profits. 
Although a reasonable interpretation, this explanation does not 
appear to be sufficiently general to serve as an adequate explanation 
for the overall Nebraska results. This explanation is probably de-
scriptive in some of the individual Nebraska cases, but the on-going 
nature of the conglomerate merger movement casts doubt upon 
the general proposition that acquisition strategies prove to be 
financially self-defeating. 
A third potential interpretation of the Nebraska-Outstate merger 
results is that the Nebraska acquisitions were accompanied by 
transfers of personnel from Nebraska. This explanation appears to 
be limited to specific mergers and relatively small numbers of 
employees. Although transfer did occur, * it does not seem probable 
that they were of a sufficient magnitude to serve as more than a 
partial explanation of the Nebraska results. 
A fourth explanation may be cited. The Nebraska-acquired firms 
may have been acquired for reasons other than their potential 
profitability. Some acquisitions may have involved attempts to 
"purchase" patent rights, trade secrets, innovative management, and 
so forth. Once these were obtained, the continued growth of the 
local firm may have been of little consequence to the acquirer. In 
some instances, the acquisition may have been an attempt to acquire 
a new market area through the elimination of local competition. 
If this were the case, local employment and payrolls might be 
adversely affected. 
A final interpertation of the observed Nebraska impact may be 
termed a "transposed-growth-strategy" explanation. It was hypoth-
esized in Chapter III that corporations with external growth poli-
cies tend to be constrained, size-maximizing companies while non-
acquiring firms usually have traditional profit-maximizing motives. 
,. In the questionnaire sent to executives of acquired Nebraska firms, over 
50 percent of the respondents indicated that there had been transfers of upper 
management personnel as a result of their mergers. 
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The non-Nebraska acquiring firms, most of which were con-
glomerates, obviously were pursuing external growth strategies. 
Being typical profit-maximizing firms, however, the Nebraska ac-
quirees were undoubtably seeking growth through internal expan-
sion. The fact that their pre-merger rates of employment and pay-
roll were typical of those of other Nebraska businesses tends to su p-
port this contention. But what occurred to the internal-growth 
strategies of the Nebraska firms upon acquisition? The external-
growth, size-maximizing policies of the acquiring firms were trans-
posed upon the local firms. That is, the Nebraska firms became a 
part of organizations with different growth philosophies. These 
new strategies were responsible for the stagnation in local employ-
ment and payroll growth. Large proportions of the available invest-
ment capital of the parent corporations may have been devoted to 
further external expansion, rather than to internal expansion of 
the operations of the many subdivisions. 
This explanation may also show why no adverse impacts were 
associated with the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers. Most of these acqui-
sitions were of the horizontal and vertical variety and involved 
small localized firms. It is doubtful, therefore, that the acquiring 
firms were pursuing a basic external growth policy. The acquisitions 
were likely prompted by expediency and not by a general desire to 
maximize size. As a result, transpositions of growth strategies did 
not occur upon acquisition. Rather, the merged firms continued to 
pursue internal expansion just as they had prior to the mergers. 
Thus, the "transposed growth strategy" hypothesis is sufficiently 
general as to be tenable with respect to the overall Nebraska 
results. This interpretation certainly deserves additional research 
exploration. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state corporations, exper-
ienced average annual pre-merger employment and payroll growth 
rates similar to other average Nebraska firms. In the post-merger 
periods, however, these rates declined sharply and were significantly 
smaller than those of average Nebraska firms. The aggregate adverse 
impact of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers was substantial. The 
"direct" 1970 loss resulting from 51 mergers alone was nearly $12 
million. Several explanations of the adverse economic employment 
and payroll effects may be advanced, but the "transposed-growth-
strategy" interpretation appears to be the most tenable general 
explanation. 
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The Nebraska-Nebraska mergers differed remarkably from the 
Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions. Firms acquired by other Nebraska 
companies were relatively slow-growing concerns in slowly ex-
panding industries. The analysis of the post-merger records of the 
merged firms indicated that no adverse Nebraska employment and 
payroll effects resulted from these acquisitions. 
v / The Outflow of Corporate Control and 
Decision-Making: Possible Economic Consequences 
An additional salient effect accompanying corporate mergers 
involving Nebraska firms is a geographical shift of corporate con-
trol and decision-making. * In a net sense, Nebraska clearly has 
not fared well in this regard. This is to suggest that during the 
period under study, 1964-1968, a substantially greater number of 
Nebraska firms were acquired by corporations residing outside of 
the state than vice versa. 
During the five-year period, 83 Nebraska firms were acquired 
by outstate concerns. Also, it should be recalled from Chapter II 
that the majority of these firms were large relative to the average-
sized firm within their 2-digit industry. During the last two years 
of the period, 1967 and 1968, 49 Nebraska firms were purchased. 
During these same two years, only 14 out-of-state corporations were 
acquired by Nebraska-based firms. Only six Nebraska corporations 
were found to be actively engaged in an acquisition program which 
involved one or more non-Nebraska corporations. t Thus the years 
1967 and 1968 witnessed a net outflow of corporate control on a 
3.5:1 basis. 
THE LOCATIONS OF NEBRASKA FIRMS ACQUIRED BY 
NON-NEBRASKA CORPORATIONS 
Table 5-1 indicates the location of the Nebraska firms which 
were acquired by non-Nebraska corporations during the period, 
1964-1968. Of 83 such firms, 45, or 54.2 percent, were located in 
Omaha, 8, or 9.6 percent, in Lincoln; and 4 in Grand Island. Thus 
over two-thirds of all the firms acquired by outstate corporations 
were located in one of Nebraska's three largest cities. 
The predominance of Omaha acquisitions is particularly obvious 
in the 1968 merger data. Nineteen of the 28 mergers occurring dur-
.. Corporate control may be defined as "decision-making authority with re-
spect to corporate assets." It is assumed that this control resides with manage-
ment rather than ,,-ith stockholders. 
t See the Appendix_ 
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TABLE 5-1 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS BY LOCATION OF THE 
ACQUIRED FIRM, 1964-1968 
Location of 
Acquired Firm 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total 
Omaha 7 2 7 10 19 45 
Lincoln 2 I I 4 8 
Grand Island I I I 4 
Fremont I 2 I 4 
Hastings I 1 I 3 
Scottsbluff 1 I 2 
Other I 3 5 6 2 17 
Total 9 9 16 21 28 83 
ing this year involved Omaha firms. Omaha, of course, is Nebraska's 
largest city with a population over twice as large as its nearest rival, 
Lincoln. If the relative frequency of mergers is computed on a per 
capita basis, however, Omaha ranks third in merger activity among 
the five largest Nebraska cities. This relationship is shown in 
Figure 5-1. 
Fremont, with .179 mergers per 1,000 people, showed the highest 
relative frequency of Nebraska-Outstate mergers, 1964-1968, among 
the five largest Nebraska cities. Grand Island was second with nearly 
.14 mergers per 1,000 population. Lincoln had relatively few 
mergers as measured on the per capita basis. A small number of 
mergers per capita need not indicate a small relative impact, how-
ever. The relative local impact of the mergers will depend upon 
the sizes of the acquired firms. 
The column marked "Other" in Table 5-1 should be noted. 
Seventeen acquisitions, each occurring in a separate community, 
are represented in this category. The population of the 13 smallest 
of these communities ranged from 5,226 to 626, with an average 
population of 1,926. In each of the thirteen cases, therefore, acqui-
sitions per capita exceeded that of Fremont. In absolute size, the 
majority of these firms were extremely small. In three of the 13 
cases, however, the firms which were acquired had approximately 
50 employees each. In their respective communities, one of which 
had a population of 626 and another 749, the acquisitions resulted 
in significant relative losses of local corporate control. 
THE LOCATIONS OF THE ACQUIRING NON-NEBRASKA CORPORATIONS 
Table 5-2 indicates the regional locations of the outstate firms 
which acquired Nebraska firms, 1964-1968.* Thirty-four of the 
* For a complete classification of acquiring firms by state, see the Appendix. 
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FIGURE 5-1 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS PER 1,000 RESIDENTS, 
BY CITY, 1964-1968 
N£'8ItIlsJdt- OIATsr!9TF 
mE"~G~I2!: PFfl /000 
PfJpu,LJII-r,olt/ 
.:w> 
.15' f-
./0 f-
<' 
:t 
l- e E .O~ 
0 
o II 
,I' 
~ 
0 
'" ~
.... 
I~ 
-
" 
-
~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /" ~ 4: Q 
-l: J.; 
<t ~ ~ :e ~ 
II II 
.~ 
.IS 
.It) 
.os 
o 
acquiring corporations, nearly 41 percent, resided in states adjacent 
to Nebraska. Twelve of these 34 firms were headquartered in Minne-
sota and 9 in Iowa. Kansas and Missouri firms each undertook five 
acquisitions. All but one of the Minnesota acquirers resided in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, and a majority of the Iowa purchasers head-
quartered in Des Moines. 
Nearly 50 percent of the non-Nebraska acquirers resided in 
either the Northeast or Mideast regions of the United States. 
Twenty-two corporations were from the former region; 18 from the 
latter. New York dominated the "Northeast" category with 10 
acquiring firms; Illinois topped the Mideast region with II. Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio each headquartered four acquir-
ing firms. 
As indicated in Figure 5-2, over 50 percent of the outflow of 
corporate control resulting from the Nebraska acquisitions ended 
up in just four states: Minnesota, Illinois, New York, and Iowa. 
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TABLE 5-2 
N EBRASKA-OUTSTATE MERGERS BY REGION OF THE ACQUIRI:-IG FIRM, 
1964-1968 
Region of Acquiring 
Corporation 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total 
Neighboring States 2 5 7 9 11 34 
(Minnesota, Iowa, 
Kansas, Missouri, 
South Dakota, 
Colorado) 
Northeast 4 2 5 10 22 
(New York, Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, 
:'\lew Jersey, 
Maryland) 
iHideast 2 2 4 6 5 19 
(Illinois, Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana) 
atheT Regions 1 4 2 8 
Total 9 9 16 21 28 83 
THE DIRECTIONAL FLOW OF CORPORATE CONTROL RESULTING FROM 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS 
It is clear from Table 5-2 and Figure 5-2 that the outfiow of 
corporate control from Nebraska has been multi-directional. A 
common thread runs through the data, however. In the great ma-
jority of instances, corporate control Howed into a state with a 
larger population than that of Nebraska. Furthermore, two of the 
regions of the United States in which a large portion of all cor-
porate control resided, the Northeast and Mideast, gained addi-
tional decision-making authority at the expense of a state which 
had relatively little such control. * 
This pattern seems to involve most of the Midwest region, in 
general. As evident from Table 5-3, the states of Nebraska, Iowa, 
South Dakota, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, and North Dakota had 
a combined net loss of corporate control of 334 manufacturing cor-
porations during the 1955-1968 period. This does not include the 
loss of control resulting from acquisitions of trade, finance, and 
service firms. If these industries were included, the net loss figure 
* for example, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois head-
quartered 77.2 percent of the combined assets of the 200 largest manufacturing 
corporations in 1968. The 200 largest corporations in the United States control 
oYer 60 percent of all the manufacturing assets in the nation. 
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FIGURE 5-2 
NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITIONS BY STATE OF THE ACQUIRING FIR:\1, 
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might be twice as large.* New York gained the largest amount of 
corporate control during this period. It showed a net gain of 1,732. 
Illinois was second with a gain of 484. 
Not only did the direction of Nebraska corporate control flow 
toward larger industrial states, it also tended to flow toward larger 
urban areas. This is clearly shown in Figure 5-3. 
" The author bases this estimate on the findings of Chapter II. There it was 
shown that more Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions involved firms engaged in 
trade, finance, and services than in manufacturing, 1964-1968. 
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TABLE 5-3 
NET LOSSES OF CORPORATE CONTROL IN MANUFACTURING, 1955-1968 
State 
Colorado 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Wyoming 
New York 
Illinois 
Companies Acquired I 
by:Firms 
Outside State 
187 
1I0 
121 
70 
7 
13 
16 
1,346 
910 
Outstate Finns 
Acquired by 
State Companies 
55 
42 
32 
54 
I 
1 
5 
3,078 
1,829 
SOL'RCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. 
Net 
Loss 
-132 
-68 
-89 
-16 
-6 
-12 
-II 
+1,732 
+484 
In 59 of the 83 instances in which non-Nebraska corporations 
acquired Nebraska firms, corporate control flowed to a larger 
metropolitan area. In other words, the metropolitan area of the 
acquiring firm had a greater population than the metropolitan 
area of the acquired Nebraska firm. In 44, or 75 percent of these 59 
instances, the population of the metropolitan area of the acquiring 
corporation exceeded one million. It is thus clear that corporate 
acquisitions of Nebraska firms have served to shift corporate control 
toward states which headquarter substantial numbers of corpora-
tions and, in particular, to concentrate that control in large urban 
centers. 
Nebraska's largest city, Omaha, has been a net loser of corporate 
control as have smaller Nebraska communities. Though Omaha 
firms, for example, acquired 13 non-Nebraska-based corporations 
in 1967-1968, out-of-state corporations acquired 29 Omaha firms 
during this same period. 
The outflow of corporate control from Nebraska and from other 
relatively sparsely populated Midwestern states could have serious 
economic, social, and political implications. These implications 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
THE DIRECTIONAL FLOW OF BUSINESS CONTROL RESULTING FROM 
NEBRASKA-NEBRASKA ACQUISITIONS 
An examination of the Nebraska-Nebraska acquisitions on the 
basis of the locations of the acquiring and acquired firms revealed 
that a net flow of corporate control toward larger communities was 
generated. Though directionally the same as the Nebraska-Outstate 
mergers, the loss of corporate control to larger communities was 
much less pronounced. Of the 66 acquisitions of Nebraska firms by 
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FIGURE 5-3 
THE PERCENTAGE OF INSTANCES IN WHICH NEBRASKA CONTROL 
FLOWED TO LARGER METROPOLITAN AREAS AND AREAS WITH 
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other Nebraska companies, 26 involved cases in which the com-
munity of the acquiring firm was larger than that of the acquiree. 
On the other hand, 13 mergers involved situations in which the 
acquiring firm was located in a smaller community than the com-
munity headquartering the acquired firm. In 27 of the 66 mergers, 
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40.9 percent, the firms were either located in the same community 
or else their respective communities were of approximately equal 
size. Thus of the 39 acquisitions which involved two unequal-sized 
communities, 66.7 percent resulted in a loss of corporate control for 
the smaller city or village. 
It should be remembered that the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers 
generally involved the acquisition of small firms. However, the 
local loss of control of a firm in a small town may be significant in 
a relative sense, regardless of the actual size of the company which 
was purchased. 
In 17 of the 26 instances in which business control flowed to a 
larger city, Omaha, Lincoln, or Grand Island was the recipient. 
Just as acquisitions of Nebraska firms by non-Nebraska corporations 
have led to a greater geographical concentration of corporate con-
trol in the U.S., the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers have resulted in a 
greater concentration of business control within Nebraska. The 
trend within Nebraska, however, has not been nearly as pronounced 
as the trend associated with the purchase of Nebraska firms by cor-
porations residing in other states. 
hiPLICATIONS OF THE OUTFLOW OF CORPORATE CONTROL: 
POPULATION DISPERSION 
The economic, sociological, and political effects associated with 
the shift of corporate control from smaller to larger communities 
are potentially of great significance. That portion of the merger 
movement in Nebraska which had involved only Nebraska firms 
has served to concentrate business control within the state. The 
portion which has involved purchases of Nebraska firms by non-
Nebraska corporations has served to drain corporate decision-
making power from Nebraska. 
In the case of Nebraska-Outstate mergers, vital economic deci-
sions which may greatly affect local Nebraska communities are 
increasingly being made from distant headquarters. This is not to 
suggest that the management of locally acquired firms relinquish 
all corporate decision-making authority upon acquisition. Obviously, 
day-to-day decisions continue to be made at the local level. The 
fact remains, however, that most major decisions, those which are 
most likely to affect the community vitally, will subsequently be 
determined in some other city. In the case of the Nebraska-Outstate 
acquisitions, this city is likely to be New York, Chicago, Min-
neapolis, or some similar urban area. In a sense, the Nebraska 
community loses a portion of the economic control of its own 
destiny. In light of the research findings stated in Chapter IV, 
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there is reason to suspect that this loss of economic decision-making 
authority, on the average, may be accompanied by adverse local 
economic repercussions. 
Though it does not appear that Nebraska-Nebraska mergers 
have been accompanied by adverse employment and payroll effects, 
other adverse local impacts may have accompanied these acquisi-
tions. For example, many of the mergers may have resulted in 
shifts in sources of supply and the abandonment of the use of local 
financial institutions. Thus, the flow of corporate control generated 
by the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers, as with the outstate acquisitions, 
may have served to affect adversely the communities of the acquired 
firms. 
The author's concern with the loss of corporate control from 
states and communities which possess relatively little such control, 
and the subsequent concentration of corporate decision making, 
goes far beyond a simple desire to preserve small enterprises. This 
matter needs further explanation. 
First, remember that the major motives underlying the current 
merger movement are largely financial. Mergers which involve true 
economies, economies which will ultimately find their way back to 
consumers in the form of lower prices, are certainly justifiable. 
However, even "efficiency" itself is subject to broader constraints. 
If the end result is undesirable, then to do something efficiently is 
to compound that undesirability. But that is another issue. Fortu-
nately, we are on safe grounds, particularly in analyzing the Ne-
braska-Outstate acquisitions, to assume that few true economies 
were involved. This is the case since these mergers were predomi-
nantly of the conglomerate type. Therefore, one may look directly 
at the negative effects of the acquisitions. 
A new and rapidly emerging concern in the United States is 
the lack of dispersion of population within the nation. The tre-
mendous flow of people from sparsely populated areas to bulging 
urban areas has given rise to tremendous economic and social prob-
lems. One need only remind the reader of air and water pollution, 
traffic congestion, urban blight, and poverty to reinforce the con-
tention that the social costs associated with our urban environment 
have tended partially to mitigate the economies resulting from a 
highly concentrated population. 
The need to reverse the population flow from our metropolitan 
areas has been widely recognized and cogently stated both by lead-
ers within the current Nixon administration and by those in the 
Democratic Party. These political pronouncements and actions are 
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actually responses to the realization that human well-being cannot 
be directly equated to the level of the Gross National Product. 
External effects and their attendant cost transfers serve to raise the 
possibility that a private decision may be accompanied by social 
costs. 
But how does this discussion concern itself with the outflow of 
corporate control from local communities? The answer, of course, 
is that population dispersion requires viable smaller communities. 
The reversal of the historical flow of people toward metropolitan 
areas requires expanding employment opportunities within smaller, 
more geographically dispersed cities and villages. Furthermore, if 
these smaller communities are to remain attractive places in which 
to reside, they must possess certain degrees of economic control 
over their own futures. The current merger movement, in effect, is 
abetting perverse locational effects. The removal of corporate con-
trol from local communities serves to dilute the viability of the 
smaller city while concentrating control in urban population 
centers. 
Samuel R. Reid, expressing a similar concern, stated: 
The loss of corporate headquarters can have a major effect 
upon the quality of life in the smaller communities which 
may add to the exodus to larger metropolitan areas which 
are already experiencing numerous problems. \l\Thile produc-
tion facilities may remain in the smaller communities, the 
executives (and those associated with their paperwork) usu-
ally are transferred to major urban centers with growing 
white collar office complexes.1 
It was concluded in Chapter IV that corporate acqUISItIOns 
which have involved non-Nebraska acquirers have had adverse 
employment and payroll effects, on the average, within the locali-
ties of the acquired firms. This is but one aspect of the outflow of 
corporate control. Some other potentialities require examination. 
REDUCTIONS IN COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
A direct economic and social impact which may result from a 
corporate acquisition is a reduction in community involvement. 
New management may replace old, and this new management may 
not possess the same degree of community pride and participation. 
It takes time to gain a community spirit, of course, and "a manager 
who is moved every two or three years becomes company oriented 
rather than community oriented."2 
Outflow of Control / 71 
It has been suggested that executives of local-based corporations 
are more likely, on the average, to give of their time to community 
causes than are newly established executives of non-Nebraska based 
companies. For example, when corporations were asked to con-
tribute ten weeks of key executive time for Nebraska's Little Hoover 
Commission, 42 executives responded favorably. Thirty-seven of 
those who undertook the research were from Omaha- or Lincoln-
based firms, three were retired, and only two were affiliated with 
Nebraska firms which had out-of-state headquarters.a 
The 'Visconsin merger study sought to test empirically the hy-
pothesis that corporate acquisitions of local firms tends to reduce 
community involvement.4 United Fund contributions were utilized 
as a proxy. The Wisconsin results were extremely mixed. Some firms 
became generous contributors upon acquisition, others sharply re-
duced their contributions. 
The contributions of 30 acquired Milwaukee firms were com-
pared with those of an equal number of firms which were not 
involved in acquisitions. Indices measuring the growth of contribu-
tions and the average contribution per employee were calculated. 
The results of the research were less than conclusive. Acquired firms 
increased their contributions about 16 percent during the years 
1958-1968; firms which were not acquired, almost 34 percent. How-
ever, the study also discovered that the subsequently acquired firms 
had a smaller average pre-merger percentage increase than did the 
non-merging corporations during the same years. 
The "\Visconsin study concluded: "The only major conclusion 
to be reached is that United Fund contributions in Milwaukee ap-
parently have been adversely affected by out-of-state acquisitions 
because of decreased rates of growth following the merger of sev-
eral Milwaukee companies."" 
Much additional research is required in this area. The loss of 
local corporate control mayor may not be accompanied by a general 
reduction in community participation. In the light of adverse em-
ployment and payroll effects suggested in Chapter IV, however, it is 
certainly doubtful that, on the average, total community contribu-
tions will increase as a result of an acquisition. Whether there is a 
likelihood that this involvement will be reduced requires further 
research. 
PLANT SHUTDOWNS 
A particularly adverse economic impact has accompanied some 
acquisitions. Sometimes they have been followed by a complete 
plant shutdown. The acquiring firm may purchase a local con-
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cern in order to secure patent rights or to secure technological 
know-how. The real property of the acquired finn may thus be of 
secondary importance. Once the acquisition has taken place, there-
fore, the local operation may be in jeopardy. The Nebraska exper-
ience, 1964-1968, witnessed at least three cases in which local opera-
tions were terminated within a few years after the acquisition. The 
exact reasons for these terminations were not discovered. The ac-
quiring firm simply may have found that it had made a poor pur-
chase. However, the pre-merger employment and payroll data on 
the firms does not indicate that they were "dying businesses" prior 
to their acquisitions. 
ADVERSE EFFECTS RESULTING FROM CHANGES IN SOURCES OF 
RAW MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES 
The outflow of business control may have multiplicative eco-
nomic impacts within the community of the acquired firm. One of 
these potential economic effects is a shift in sources of raw materials 
and general supplies. In those instances in which the acquisition is 
accompanied by centralized purchasing, local suppliers who pre-
viously held accounts with the local firm will sufler. Such effects 
tend to multiply themselves through the community and thereby 
serve to decrease employment opportunities and income within 
the locality. 
Of course, the local loss is someone else's gain. The new source 
of supply, however, is likely to be located in or near the urban 
area in which the acquirer resides. * Thus the secondary effects of 
the business acquisition tend to propel the movement of corporate 
control and population toward metropolitan areas. With this move-
ment come the attendant social costs. 
It should be remembered that few, if any, substantial true 
economies are likely to result from mergers, particularly those of the 
conglomerate type. Thus the shift to centralized purchasing is 
usually a matter of managerial expediency. In many instances, how-
ever, the monopsonistic purchasing power of the parent corporation 
may result in some cost saving for the local firm. But even when this 
is the case, the resulting resource allocation may be less desirable 
than it was previously. This is to suggest that private efficiency need 
not correspond to a socially efficient allocation of resources. The 
external diseconomies generated by the accompanying population 
" This may not be true in all cases, however. If the raw matcl'ials are bulky 
and therefore incur high transportation costs, the new source of supply will 
likel y be gcographically close to the acquired firm. 
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shift may far outweigh the private advantages associated with the 
more efficient purchasing of supplies. 
Economists have long realized that private efficiency may be 
accompanied by social cost. In the above case, these costs may exceed 
the resource allocation benefits; and as a result, a move which 
seemingly would be "efficient" is not socially efficient owing to the 
external diseconomies involved. Thus a socially efficient resource 
allocation, one which considers external effects, may require modi-
fication of private business actions. 
TABLE 5-4 
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY OF ACQUIRED FIRMS) CHANGES IN 
SOURCE OF SUPPLY 
Question: Does your firm utilize the same suppliers of raw materials and gen-
eral supplies that it did pre-merger or docs it now rely on centralized 
purchasing by the parent company? 
Responses I Nebraska-Outstate I Nebraska-Nebraska I I I 
No Change 
Centralized Purchasing 
Both 
Total 
17 11 
10 8 
4 
31 19 
Total 
28 
18 
4 
50 
Table 5-4 displays the results of the Nebraska merger survey 
with respect to changes in sources of supply. Of the 50 participants 
in the survey, 31 were executives of firms acquired by non-:\'ebraska 
corporations; 19 were executives of firms acquired by other Ne-
braska firms. * 
In both the Nebraska-Outstate and Nebraska-Nebraska cases, 
the majority of the acquired firms witnessed no change in their 
sources of supplies. However, in approximately 45 percent of the 
outstate acquisitions and 42 percent of the instate mergers, changes 
did occur. This is particularly significant in the Nebraska-Outstate 
case since it is likely that the use of centralized purchasing resulted 
in a substantial loss to Nebraska business. The 10 firms which 
switched to centralized purchasing included several which would be 
considered relatively large Nebraska firms. Hence, these shifts in 
sources of supply probably entailed large dollar losses of business 
to their previous suppliers. It should be pointed out, however, that 
in many instances the original source of supply may have been out-
state before the merger. 
* To the extent that some executives might not wish to indicate local 
effects, the survey may contain a bias. If such a bias is involved, the results 
actually understate the adverse local impacts. 
74 / Local Impacts of Mergers 
It is difficult to assess the actual economic impact resulting from 
changes in sources of supply. Suffice it to say, however, that the 
possibility that such changes will accompany a merger serves to 
increase the probability that adverse local economic impacts will 
accompany it. 
ADVERSE EFFECTS RESULTING FROM THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PARENT 
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
The outflow of business control may have adverse local multi-
plicative effects in other ways. Upon acquisition, the acquired firm 
may begin to use the banking, insurance, accounting, and other 
financial institutions which are employed by the parent corporation. 
It may also rely on legal services provided through the parent com-
pany rather than local services. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 indicate that 
these effects were more pronounced than were changes in sources 
of supply. 
As may be seen in Table 5-5, in over 45 percent of the Nebraska-
Outstate cases surveyed, the acquired firm currently relies exclu-
sively upon the financial institutions employed by the parent cor-
poration. Another 29 percent currently use both local and parent 
corporation financial institutions. Therefore, in the Nebraska-
Outstate experience, nearly 75 percent of the Nebraska firms appar-
ently abandoned the services of some or all of their local financial 
institutions. The biggest local loss was probably in the banking area. 
Since many of the acquired Nebraska firms were large, their local 
accounts were obviously substantial. The loss of these accounts likely 
was accompanied by multiplicative adverse economic impacts within 
the local community. 
Inasmuch as a large majority of the acquiring firms were located 
in large metropolitan areas, financial institutions within these areas 
were probably the recipients of the new business. Once again, then, 
it may well be that the concentration of corporate control resulting 
from the Nebraska mergers served further to geographically con-
centrate economic activity. 
Although approximately 63 percent of the Nebraska-Nebraska 
acquisitions involved changes in the use of financial institutions, 
the adverse local effects were likely to be much more subdued than 
in the Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions. The reason this was prob-
ably true is that many of the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers involved 
firms which resided in the same community. Therefore, the shift 
of financial institutions which may have accompanied the acquisi-
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TABLE 5-5 
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY OF ACQUIRED FIRMS, CHANGES IN 
THE USE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Question: Does your firm currently utilize the same financial (banking, insur-
ance, etc.) institutions as it did before the merger or does it now 
utilize those of the acquiring company? 
Nebraska· Nebraska· 
Responses Outstate Nebraska Total 
Same Institutions 8 10 18 
Parent Company's Institutions 14 9 23 
Both 9 9 
Total 31 19 50 
tion would have no net effect locally. One local bank's loss would 
simply be another local bank's gain. Furthermore, the transfer of 
business control in some of the Nebraska-Nebraska mergers involved 
two relatively small communities. Though the shift of financial 
institutions would definitely have adverse local effects in the com-
munity of the acquired firm, the slightly larger community would 
benefit. Since both of the communities were small, the perverse 
population effects associated with the Nebraska-Outstate mergers 
would not be of serious consequence. 
Results very similar to those of the Nebraska survey were ob-
tained in a survey of 20 Wisconsin executives whose firms had been 
recently acquired.6 The Wisconsin study found that in 70 percent 
of the cases the acquired firms had shifted in whole or in part to 
the financial institutions of the acquiring companies. Fifteen of 
the 20 surveyed executives were associated with firms which were 
acquired by non-Wisconsin corporations. The combined results of 
the Nebraska and Wisconsin surveys allow one to conclude that 
acquisitions are likely to be accompanied by adverse local effects 
resulting from the abandonment of local financial institutions. 
Table 5-6 indicates that the communities of the acquired Ne-
braska firms (on the average) were adversely affected in yet another 
sense. Acquired firms tended to abandon the use of local legal serv-
ices. Owing to the factors mentioned earlier, the Nebraska-Outstate 
responses are of the most significance. Here we see that nearly 75 
percent of the acquired companies currently utilize legal services 
provided through their parent corporations. Seventeen of the 31 
acquired firms make exclusive use of their parent's legal services; 
another 7 use them to a lesser degree. 
Once again the results of the Wisconsin study are in general 
conformity with the Nebraska experience. In 75 percent of the Wis-
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TABLE 5-6 
RESULTS OF THE NEBRASKA SURVEY OF ACQUIRED FIRMS, CHANGES IN 
THE USE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
Question: Does your firm currently utilize local legal services or services provided 
through the parent company? 
Nebraska- Nebraska-
Responses Outstate Nebraska Total 
Local Services 7 6 13 
Parent Company's Services 17 12 29 
Both 7 1 8 
-
Total 31 19 50 
consin cases surveyed, the acquiring firm's legal services were used 
in whole or in part. 
It is likely that the larger acquiring corporations possessed their 
own legal departments. Upon acquisition the services of these de-
partments became available to the local firms. Where duplication of 
legal personnel was involved, some true economies may have re-
sulted. However, when the acquired firm was relatively large, the 
parent corporation was likely to need to expand its legal staff to 
serve the additional corporate entity. The expansion of employment 
opportunities in the locality of the parent corporation would, in 
effect, come at the expense of those individuals and firms which had 
previously provided the legal services for the acquired firm. 
Since the acquiring firms tended to be located in larger metro-
politan areas, the shifts in the use of legal services tended to promul-
gate the flow of population toward metropolitan areas. The loss 
of local corporate control has thus been shown once again to serve 
to undermine the economic viability of the smaller city or locality. 
These adverse effects-changes in sources of supply and shifts in 
the utilization of financial and legal services-are multiplicative. 
The total impact on the local community will exceed the simple 
dollar expenditure loss. This is due to the fact that such dollars 
would have been respent within the community. Thus, for example, 
the dollar loss to the local legal firm may be felt in part by the local 
car dealer, clothing store, and so on. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Nebraska merger experience, 1964-1968, reveals several geo-
graphic trends with respect to corporate control. The Nebraska-
Outstate mergers have resulted in marked shifts of corporate con-
trol from smaller to larger cities. A majority of the acquiring firms 
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resided in metropolitan areas of over one million residents. The 
outflow of corporate control from Nebraska served further to con-
centrate it within the United States. To a lesser extent, the N e-
braska-Nebraska mergers have resulted in shifts of business control 
from smaller to larger Nebraska communities. 
These shifts of corporate control are often accompanied by 
adverse local economic effects. These effects are multiplicative. They 
include shifts in sources of supply; changes in the use of banking, 
accounting, and other financial services; and abandonment of the 
use of local legal services. 
The outflow of corporate control is a phenomenon shared by 
other rural Midwestern states. The economic, sociological, and poli-
tical implications of this outflow deserve careful consideration. This 
is particularly true in the light of an announced policy to stem the 
migration of population toward the urban areas. 
The author's concern in this area is a shared one. In fact, the 
wide dispersion of the control of American enterprise was a primary 
concern of the authors of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 
1950. Senator Kefauver expressed this concern in Congressional 
hearings on his bill when he stated: 
Local economic independence cannot be preserved in 
the face of consolidations such as we have had during the 
past few years. The control of American business is steadily 
being transferred from local communities to a few large 
cities in which central managers decide the policies and the 
fate of the far-flung enterprises they control. Millions of 
people depend helplessly on their judgment. Through mo-
nopolistic mergers the people are losing the power to direct 
their own economic welfare.' 
In discussing the issue of shifts in corporate control resulting 
from mergers, Senator Gaylord Nelson recently concluded: 
My only point is that all of us should understand this 
[the centralization of corporate control] to be true. Not that 
there is something intrinsically evil about it. Maybe it is a 
more prudent decision when it is made in New York for a 
community in Wichita than when Wichita men made it. I 
think you would get a lot of static if you made the suggestion 
in Wichita. But it is a fact of life ... and if the trend con-
tinues at the rate indicated here, we had better understand 
fully the implications.s 
VI/Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
SUMMARY OF BASIC FINDINGS 
The Nebraska merger experience, 1964-1968, closely paralleled 
the national merger movement. Both movements displayed a sharp 
upturn during the last two years of the period. Eighty-two of the 
149 acquisitions of Nebraska firms, 1964-1968, occurred in 1967 and 
1968. In both the national and Nebraska cases, the current move-
ment has become basically conglomerate. Nearly 70 percent of the 
acquisitions of Nebraska firms by out-of-state corporations were of 
this type. The recent Nebraska movement also paralleled the na-
tional one in that it involved firms in trade, finance, insurance, and 
services, as well as in manufacturing. 
The basic motives for agreeing to be acquired appeared to be 
financial in nature. Several corporate tax factors have encouraged 
mergers by subsidizing external expansion. Section 368 of the 
Internal Revenue Code has enabled stockholders of involved firms 
to avoid taxes on capital gains resulting from mergers. In addition, 
since interest payments are deductible business expenses, debt 
securities often have been issued and exchanged for the common 
stock of an acquired corporation. Thus, the shareholders of the 
acquired company are paid interest rather than dividends and the 
net income from the acquired unit is increased substantially. Tax 
loss credits and investment credits also have encouraged mergers. 
Corporations with high tax-loss carryovers and/or investment tax 
credits have a financial incentive to find merger partners with 
sufficient income against which these tax advantages may be charged. 
Mergers have been encouraged by certain accounting and stock 
market factors. Both the pooling of interest and purchase accounting 
methods of recording mergers have allowed corporations to suppress 
costs and thereby inflate apparent earnings. Also, instantaneous 
gains in earnings per share are achieved whenever the price-earn-
ings ratio of the acquired firms is less than that of the acquiring 
company. Since the stock market has historically rewarded increases 
in earnings per share regardless of how they were achieved, external 
growth firms benefit unduly. 
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In some cases, mergers are accompanied by economies of scale. 
This does not appear to be the case in most instances, however. 
Conglomerate mergers, by their very nature, preclude most types 
of potential economies. The growth of conglomerate mergers may 
be the result of the adaption of con trained size maximization mo-
tives by many large corporations. The managers of these firms find 
that they may expand their corporation's asset size, sales, and reve-
nues through acquisitions, and, thereby, maximize their own finan-
cial and psychological rewards. The financial advantages accruing 
from the tax, accounting, and stock market biases enable these 
firms to continue providing satisficing rates of return to stock-
holders. 
An in-depth examination of the pre- and post-merger growth 
rates of the Nebraska firms acquired by out-of-state corporations 
leads one to the conclusion that these mergers have adversely 
affected employment and payroll in Nebraska. The Nebraska-Out-
state acquired firms were found to be growing at an average annual 
pre-merger employment and payroll rate approximately equal to 
those of average firms in their respective 2-digit industries. In the 
post-merger period, this was not the case. The average post-merger 
employment and payroll rates of the acquired firms were negative 
and were significantly smaller than the mean industry average rates. 
The aggregate adverse employment and payroll effects of these 
mergers were substantial. On the other hand, no apparent negative 
employment and payroll effects resulted from the mergers in which 
one Nebraska enterprise purchased another. 
Although several potential explanations for the adverse impacts 
of the Nebraska-Outstate mergers may be offered, a "transposed-
growth-strategy" interpretation appears to be the most satisfactory. 
The external-growth philosophies of the acquiring firms may have 
been transposed upon the theretofore internal-growth strategies of 
the acquired firms. Under the domination of the external-growth 
strategies, internal expansion of the individual units may have been 
sacrificed for continued growth via acquisition. This interpretation, 
of course, is consistent with the constrained size maximization 
hypothesis. 
An additional adverse impact of the Nebraska-Outstate acquisi-
tions was the resulting outflow of corporate control and decision-
making authority from Nebraska. In over 70 percent of the acquisi-
tions, corporate control flowed to a larger metropolitan area. Firms 
located in New York, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota accounted for 
over 50 percent of the Nebraska acquisitions, 1964-1968. 
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The net outflow of corporate control from Nebraska was a 
phenomenon shared by other Midwestern states. During 1955-1968, 
the states of Nebraska, Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, Kansas, 
Colorado, and 'l\Tyoming experienced a combined net outflow of 
corporate control of 334 manufacturing concerns. 1£ other types of 
enterprises were included, this figure would be at least twice as 
large. The loss of corporate control by sparsely populated states 
serves to undermine the economic viability of these states and serves 
further to concentrate both decision-making and population. 
The Nebraska-Outstate acquisitions adversely affected Nebraska 
employment and income in "indirect" as well as in "direct" fash-
ions. In a survey of executives of acquired firms, approximately 45 
percent of the respondents indicated that their companies, either 
in whole or in part, switched to centralized purchasing upon acqui-
sition. :\'early 75 percent of the respondents indicated that their 
Nebraska firms abandoned the services of some, or all, of their local 
financial institutions. Likewise, over 77 percent of the executives 
stated that their firms currently use legal services provided through 
their parent corporations. 
LWPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Although the economic slowdown during 1970 and 1971 has 
served to retard the advance of the merger wave, most observers 
feel that the current merger movement will regain its unprecedented 
momentum once full economic recovery occurs. Hence, it appears 
that the merger problem will remain for some time. To the extent 
that the Nebraska experience is representative of the experience 
of acquired firms in other states, this trend may pose a threat to 
the economic vitality and viability of small- and medium-sized com-
munities. In Nebraska, corporate acquisitions have adversely 
affected employment and income within the communities of the 
acquired firms. The loss of employment opportunities in rural states 
such as Nebraska is of national importance. The rural to urban 
exodus is well documented. If the rates of growth of employment 
opportunities in the larger cities in rural America are not suffi-
cient to handle this exodus, there is little hope of obtaining the 
expressed national goal of reversing the flow of population from 
less-populated states to densely-populated metropolitan areas. The 
social costs of the merger movement may far outweigh the private 
and social gains derived from it. 
Most economists have long desired a wide geographical disper-
sion of economic control. The Nebraska merger findings indicate 
that this wide dispersion is threatened. The loss of decision-making 
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power in states such as Nebraska has served further to concentrate 
the control of American business. This concentration has important 
economic and political implications. 
The pre-merger data indicated that the acquired Nebraska firms 
were internal-growth oriented. This did not appear to be the post-
merger case. Apparently, the external-growth strategies of the parent 
corporations stifled further local expansion. Thus the possibility 
arises that not only employment and payrolls were adversely affected. 
Annual investment in new plant and equipment also may have 
declined. 
Internal expansion adds to the nation's capacity to produce 
goods anel services. External expansion, on the other hanel, only 
changes ownership anel control of existing capacity. If internal and 
external expansion compete for funds, then corporate acquisitions 
clearly impede economic growth. This growth is a vital necessity in 
areas where the industrial base is extremely small and where rural 
migration is large. 
Diversification through internal expansion promotes product 
competition but this is not the case with external growth.1 Internal 
expansion results in a greater number of firms in the industries 
in which the diversification occurs. Diversification via acquisition, 
on the other hand, leaves the number of competitors unchanged. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The merger policy of the United States government has long 
focused upon anti-competitive effects. Logically, this must remain 
the primary economic concern. However additional factors, namely 
local economic impacts and the growing concentration of economic 
control, need to be made subordinate considerations. A systematic, 
comprehensive national examination of these economic and social 
impacts is required. Such an examination would provide a logical 
foundation for a reformulation of U.S. merger laws. 
Some mergers involve economies of scale and these should not 
be discouraged. However, the potential social costs of the contin-
uing merger wave demand a new approach to merger policy. 
One possible new approach to the merger issue is the levying of 
a merger tax based upon the asset sizes of the involved firms. This 
tax would have a dual purpose. First, it would discourage mergers 
by mitigating the financial windfalls resulting from the institutional 
factors cited earlier. Second, it would provide a large source of funds 
to be used for both pre- and post-merger antitrust investigations. 
Currently, only a small percentage of all mergers are investigated 
owing to limitations of staff and funds. 
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Under the provisions of the tax system, firms would be required 
to report pending mergers as well as the exact procedure under 
which the merger would be consummated. There would be a re-
quirement that these reports be filed at least six months prior to the 
time of actual takeover. This reporting would have two specific 
benefits. First, a complete merger list would necessarily result. Cur-
rently no such list exists, and as a result research and investigation 
are seriously hampered. Second, in selected cases pre-merger investi-
gations might be undertaken. In view of the magnitude of the cur-
rent merger movement and its potential social costs, merger tax pro-
posals deserve careful consideration. 
At the state and local level, several policies recommend them-
selves. First, additional research in the area of local effects of cor-
porate mergers should be undertaken. In particular, the effects of 
mergers upon annual expenditures for new plant and equipment 
require attention. Also, the validity of the "transposed-growth-
strategy" interpretation of the Nebraska post-merger results should 
be investigated empirically. A follow-up study of the growth rates 
of the acquired Nebraska firms would establish whether the five-
year post-merger rates were the results of transitions to new opera-
tions or were indeed secular in nature. 
A second recommendation is that the Nebraska Economic De-
velopment Commission take an active interest in the merger prob-
lem. Legislation requiring the reporting of all mergers or acquisi-
tions involving Nebraska firms would be extremely beneficial. A 
complete merger list is absolutely essential to further research. 
The Economic Development Commission should establish com-
mittees composed of Nebraska businessmen and local and state 
governmental officials to visit the new executives of recently merged 
firms. These committees could welcome the new corporations to 
Nebraska and encourage future internal expansion of the Nebraska 
operations. These committees might include representatives of local 
suppliers of raw materials and officials of local banking and other 
financial institutions. 
A third recommendation is directed toward potential acquirees. 
In many instances mergers are undertaken without sufficient pre-
merger investigation. Executives and stockholders of Nebraska cor-
porations should study carefully the post-merger histories of other 
firms acquired by the potential acquirer. Furthermore, the question 
of potential adverse local economic effects should be raised by stock-
holders and management of local firms during merger negotiations. 
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Finally, a greater awareness of potential adverse local conse-
quences of the acquisitions must be brought about. The basic find-
ings of the Nebraska merger study should receive state-wide dissemi-
nation. A re-examination of the conventional wisdom is required. 
An awareness of the Nebraska findings is essential to the imple-
mentation of actions designed to reduce the adverse local impacts 
of corpora te mergers. 
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Appendix 
APPENDIX TABLE I 
SELECTED LISTING OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUISITION, 1964-1968:1 
Year Acquirer Acquiree 
1964 Rohm-Haas Co. Grain Belt Supply Co. 
Philadelphia, Pa. Omaha 
1964 Needham Packing Co. Ross Packing Co. 
Sioux City, Ia. Omaha 
1964 Blaustein Industries KBON Radio 
Baltimore, Maryland Omaha 
1964 Ra yette, Inc. Tip Top Products Co. 
New York, N.Y. Omaha 
1964 Mobil Oil Corp. Northern Natural Gas 
New York, N.Y. Producing Co. 
Omaha 
1964 Gas and Chemical, Inc. Blu Flame Gas 
Miami, Okla. Omaha 
1965 Allied Mutual Ins. Co. Standard Reliance 
Des Moines, Ia. Lincoln 
1965 Northwest Bankcorporation Center Bank 
Minneapolis, Minn. Omaha 
1965 Custom Farm Service, Inc. Martson Ag·Service 
div. of City Services Central City 
New York, N.Y. 
1965 Avco Delta Corp. Iowa Finance Co. 
subs. of Avco Corp. Omaha 
New York, N.Y. 
1965 Gamble-Robinson Ulry Talbert Co. 
Minneapolis, Minn. Grand Island 
1966 Yellow-Transit Freight Watson-'Vilson Trans. 
Kansas City, Mo. Omaha 
1966 Beatrice Foods Sunglow Dairy Products 
Chicago, Ill. Holdrege 
1966 CIBA Corporation Gland-O·Lac Co. 
Summi t, N.J. Omaha 
1966 Speidel Newspapers, Inc. Fremont Newspapers, Inc. 
Reno, Nevada Fremont 
1966 Fuqua Industries Nebraska Crib and Silo Co. 
Atlanta, Georgia Fremont 
1966 Hoover Ball and Tractor Stilts Co. 
Bearing Co. (Tote Systems) 
Ann Arbor, Michigan Beatrice 
a Only 56 of the 83 Nebraska·Outstate acquisitions, 1964-1968, are listed owing to the 
fact that confidential records were utilized in identifying many of the mergers. No listing 
of Nebraska-Nebraska mergers is given since nearly all of these mergers were identified 
through these confidential sources. 
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TABLE I -Continued 
Year Acquirer Acquiree 
1966 Lady Baltimore Foods Harry Rubenstein Foods 
Kansas City, Mo. Omaha 
1966 Eli Lilly and Co. Corvel, Inc. 
Indianapolis, Ind. Omaha 
1966 Metz Baking Co. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc. 
Sioux City, la. Omaha 
1966 Liberty Records, Inc. TDC Electronic, Inc. 
(Liberty IV A, Inc.) Omaha 
Los Angeles, Cal. 
1967 Gamble-Robinson Brown Fruit Co. 
Minneapolis, Minn. Grand Island 
1967 Fidelity Bankers Life Central National Insurance 
Richmond, Va. Group 
Omaha 
1967 International Funeral Crosby-Kunold, Inc. 
Services Omaha 
Des Moines, la. 
1967 Imperial Eastman Corp. Brunning Co. 
(ITE Imperial) Lincoln 
Chicago, Ill. 
1967 Ruben H. Donnelley Corp. Direct Mail Service, Inc. 
Chicago, Ill. Omaha 
1967 Moore (Samuel) and Co. Couplematic, Inc. 
Mantua, Ohio Lyman 
1967 Allegheny Ludlum Steel Ogallala Electronics 
Corp_ Ogallala 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 
1967 Edward Hines Lumber Co. Nebraska Bridge Supply 
Chicago, Ill. and Lumber Co. 
Omaha 
1967 Biedarman National Stores Orchard and Wilhelm 
div. of American Investment Omaha 
Co. 
St. Louis, Mo. 
1967 Diamond Shamrock Clarks Products 
Cleveland, Ohio Ralston 
1967 Chesebrough Ponds, Inc. V.S. Brush Co. 
Clinton, Conn. Omaha 
1967 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. National Indemnity Co_ 
New Bedford, Mass. Omaha 
1967 Grain Belt Breweries Storz Brewing Co. 
Minneapolis, Minn. Omaha 
1967 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. National Fire and 
New Bedford, Mass. Marine, Inc. 
Omaha 
1967 W. R. Grace and Co. Norfolk Grain and Feed Co. 
New York, N.Y. Norfolk 
1968 Mid-Continent Bottlers Royal Crown Bottlers 
Des Moines, la. Omaha 
1968 Briggs Transportation Co. Peterson and Peterson 
St. Paul, Minn. Grand Island 
1968 Benjamin Moore Corp. Pioneer Glass and Paint 
New York, N.Y. Omaha 
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TABLE I-Continued 
Year Acquirer Acquiree 
1968 Minnesota Paints, Inc. Omaha Paint and Glass 
Minneapolis, Minn. Omaha 
1968 Midland National Life Investors Life of Nebraska 
Watertown, S.D. Omaha 
1968 Actronics, Inc. Glauber Valve Co. 
'Valtham, Mass. Omaha 
1968 Dravo Corp. Hastings, Ind. 
Pittsburgh, Pa. Omaha and Hastings 
1968 Harcourt, Brace, and Nebraska Farmer Co. 
World, Inc. Lincoln 
;'>Jew York, N.Y. 
1968 Maremount Corp. Sidles Co., Auto Div. 
Chicago, Ill. Omaha 
1968 Josten's, Inc. Craft Guild Products, Inc. 
Owatonna, Minn. Omaha 
1968 AirKaman Corp. Duncan Beechcraft of Omaha 
Bloomfield, Conn. Omaha 
1968 Emhan Corp. Notifier Corporation 
Hartford, Conn. Lincoln 
1968 C. J. Patterson Co. House of Bauer 
Kansas City, Mo. Chocolates, Inc. 
Lincoln 
1968 Gucrden Industries Magnolia Homes Mfr. Co. 
Louisville, Ky. Scottsbluff 
1968 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. The Sun Newspapers 
New Bedford, Mass. Omaha 
1968 'Veils Fargo, Inc. Samardick Enterprises 
subs. of Baker Industries Omaha 
Los Angeles, Cal. 
1968 Ogden Food Corp. Hayden House, Inc. 
Toledo, Ohio Omaha 
1968 Denver Midwest Motor Lincoln Motor Freight 
Freight Lincoln 
Denver, Colo. 
1968 Premium Service Corp. Blackstone Hotel 
Minneapolis, Minn. Omaha 
1968 Sunray DX Oil Co. Schaeffer Oil Co. 
Tulsa, Okla. Omaha 
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APPENDIX TABLE II 
MERGERS INVOLVING NEBRASKA ACQUIRERS AND OUT-OF-STATE FIRMS, 
1967-1968 
Nebraska Acquirer 
Northern Natural Gas Co. 
Omaha 
Fairmont Foods, Co. 
Omaha 
Nebraska Consolidated Mills 
Omaha, 
Data Documents, Ine. 
Omaha 
Calandra Photo, Inc. 
Omaha 
Lockwood Corp. 
Gering 
IYear 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1968 
1968 
1968 
1968 
1967 
1967 
1968 
1967 
1968 
Acquiree 
Mineral Industries, Inc. 
Chicago, Ill. 
Varney Chemical Corp. 
Janesville, Wise. 
National Poly Products 
Mankato, Minn. 
Kitty Clover Potato Chip Co. 
Wichita, Kans. 
Utotem, Inc. 
Houston, Texas 
Origena Pizza Crust Co. 
Toronto, Onto 
Taylor Biscuit Co. 
(location unknown) 
Alora Food Products, Ltd. 
Toronto, Ont. 
Birdsey Flour Mills 
Macon, Ga. 
Punch-card div. of Univac, 
div. of Sperry Rand Corp. 
Minneapolis, Minn. 
General Computer Forms 
(location unknown) 
Williams and Marcus Co. 
Primos, Pa. 
Don Wright Photo Service 
Rock Island, Ill. 
Innes Co. 
Bettendorf, Ia. 
.sOURCE: National Industrial Conferences Board Merger Reports} Afoody's Industrial 
] ournal} Standard and POOTS. 
90 / Local Impacts of Mergers 
APPENDIX TABLE III 
CLASSIFICATION OF NEBRASKA-OUTSTATE ACQUIRING FIRMS BY 
LOCATION, 1964-1968 
Location of Acquiring Firm 
Neighboring States 
Minnesota 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Missouri 
Colorado 
South Dakota 
Total 
Northeast 
New York 
Massachusetts 
Pennsylvania .. 
Connecticut 
]';ew Jersey 
Maryland 
Total 
Mid-East 
Illinois 
Ohio 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Total 
Others 
Oklahoma 
California 
Virginia 
Georgia 
Nevada 
Total 
Total 
12 
9 
5 
5 
2 
1 
34 
10 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
22 
11 
4 
2 
1 
1 
19 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
8 
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